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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the acquisition process of the U.S. 
Marine Corps (USMC) CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter. With the ability to 
carry 27,000 lbs over 110 nautical miles in hot temperatures and within the same 
shipboard logistic footprint as its predecessor, the CH-53K will be the backbone of the 
USMC’s ship-to-shore aviation operations. However, numerous performance 
setbacks have incurred significant cost growth for the USMC and delayed the 
aircraft’s deployment to 2023–2024, two decades after the program was initiated in 
2003. This research examines the program, in the format of a case history, to better 
understand the decisions and scenarios that led to increased cost growth and delayed 
schedules. The case history is intended to educate readers on the numerous complex 
considerations found within any acquisition process, in the hopes of applying the 
lessons learned to future programs in order to provide the best solution for the 
warfighter. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the average age of the CH-53E Super Stallion at a staggering 32.6 years old, 
the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is in critical need of a heavy-lift helicopter replacement 
(Reim, 2018). As modern weapon systems become more complex, many become heavier 
and require an aircraft with increased lift capacity for the USMC to remain mission capable. 
In 2000, the USMC announced plans to build such an aircraft while also budgeting to 
extend the service life of the current CH-53E to 2025 (Naval Technology, n.d.-a). The 
Heavy Lift Replacement Program, featuring what was later named the CH-53K King 
Stallion, was initiated in 2005 with an anticipated initial operational capability (IOC) in 
September 2015. Capable of lifting 27,000 lb (12,247 kg) for 110 nautical miles in high/
hot environments and up to 36,000 lb (16,329 kg) in less extreme temperatures, the CH-
53K can lift three times the load of its predecessor (U.S. Navy, 2019). Using its external 
cargo hook, the CH-53K can lift two high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles 
(HMMWV), two joint tactical vehicles (JLTV), or a light armored vehicle (LAV) while 
still carrying supplies internally as shown in Figure 1 (Marines, n.d.).  
 
Figure 1. CH-53K King Stallion lifts a JLTV during testing demonstration in 
Patuxent River, MD. Source: Snow (2018). 
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Like the CH-53E, its mission sets will include assault transport of weapons, 
equipment, and Marines; recovery of downed aircraft or equipment; casualty evacuation; 
airborne assault support; and humanitarian assistance as shown in Figure 2 (Perrin, 2018). 
The CH-53K’s increased capability compared to its predecessor, while still maintaining 
the same shipboard logistical footprint, makes it an unparalleled asset in the USMC aircraft 
arsenal. Unfortunately, repeated program delays—including poor performance testing 
results, budgetary constraints, and contractor challenges—pushed the warfighter’s IOC to 
September 2021 with full operational capability delayed until 2023–2024.  
   
Figure 2. CH-53E Super Stallion recovers downed Canadian CH-47 
Chinook in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. Source: James (2011). 
Until early 2020, the CH-53K program was under heavy scrutiny by the Pentagon 
and Congress for its repeated delays, poor technical performance, and additional requests 
for more funding when the aircraft’s numerous deficiencies had few foreseeable solutions. 
Considerations for alternatives, such as a modified CH-47F Chinook, a medium-lift 
helicopter originally built for the U.S. Army, were proposed as a replacement for the CH-
53K, since its technical deficiencies were unlikely to be solved. Despite congressional 
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pressures, Lieutenant General Steven Rudder, the deputy commandant for aviation, 
continued to advocate for the CH-53K and stated, “We have not found another platform 
that can accomplish everything we can off of a ship at the distances and weight that we’re 
asking it to do” (Harkins, 2019, para. 3). 
Even after most of the CH-53K’s technical problems were solved in late 2019, the 
Pentagon still considered reducing the 200 CH-53K order and supplementing operational 
need with the modified CH-47 in order to reduce costs (Trail, 2020). From 1998 to 2003, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) armed forces attempted the Joint Shipboard Helicopter 
Integration Process (JSHIP) program in which they tried to develop a standard procedure 
to incorporate every Service’s rotary aircraft on board U.S. Naval ships (Trail, 2020). 
Ultimately, the initiative was canceled because, as Army Major General Geoffrey Lambert 
and Navy Lieutenant Commander Mark Huber explained,  
It is unreasonable to expect Army and Air Force helicopters to operate with 
the same ease on ships as their Navy and Marine Corps counterparts. … 
Unless Army and Air Force rotary-wing aircraft are designed with 
shipboard operations in mind—an expensive and unrealistic proposition—
the same challenges will arise. (Trail, 2020, para. 6)  
A. GOALS 
The purpose of this research is to use the CH-53K program as a realistic example 
for students and experts alike to better understand the defense acquisition process and to 
improve decision-making for future acquisition programs. Specific goals of this research 
include 
∑ explaining the importance of the CH-53K to the USMC, 
∑ outlining the standard defense acquisition process, how the CH-53K 
program deviated from it, and whether these deviations improved or 
diminished the program’s outcome, 
∑ developing a case history that outlines the CH-53K’s program of record 
(POR) to understand why the program office made certain decisions, and 
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∑ providing lessons learned and recommendations for future acquisition 
program handling and future research topics. 
B. OVERVIEW 
The following chapters describe the defense acquisition process and how it was 
used for the CH-53K program. After explicitly outlining the steps of the acquisition process 
and the POR for the CH-53K, the paper continues with a literature review of all official 
reports published on the program. This includes governmental reports, publications from 
third-party entities, and articles from news and media sources, all used to describe how the 
CH-53K will integrate into the fleet and the benefits the CH-53K will provide. The focus 
of this research is a case history, designed to analyze the critical decisions made throughout 
the CH-53K’s POR and understand the influences behind those decisions. Lastly, this effort 
concludes with lessons learned and recommendations for future research.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
The following chapter is divided into two parts. The first part outlines how the 
defense acquisition process operates in relationship to warfighter requirements and budget 
processes as well as all the major milestones and decision points within the defense 
acquisition system (DAS) as described in the DoDI 5000.02T, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, updated January 23, 2020 (Department of Defense [DOD], 2020b). 
According to DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF), 
effective as of January 23, 2020, the AAF is used to support the National Defense Strategy 
by delivering effective, suitable, survivable, sustainable, and affordable solutions to the 
warfighter through the DAS (Department of Defense [DOD], 2020a). Although adaptable 
to a specific program, the AAF is a general acquisition strategy (see Figure 3) that all 
acquisition efforts and major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) follow to develop 
new technologies for the warfighter.
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Figure 3. Adaptive Acquisition Framework. Source: DOD (2020a). 
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The second part of this chapter provides a history of the CH-53 platform since its first use 
in the Vietnam era and a description of the new CH-53K model’s mission, capabilities, and 
operational deployment.  
A. PART I: THE “BIG A” ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Defense acquisition programs are organized into different categories based on their 
purpose, cost threshold, and decision authority. Programs are identified as MDAPs, Major 
Automated Information Systems (MAIS), or Major Systems and can be designated by 
acquisition categories (ACAT) I through III depending on cost and/or importance (DOD, 
2020b). MDAPs that are estimated to exceed more than $480 million (constant year [CY] 
2014 dollars) for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) or $2.79 billion 
(CY2014 dollars) are categorized as ACAT 1 programs (DOD, 2020b). The CH-53K King 
Stallion heavy-lift helicopter is an ACAT 1 program because it exceeds the cost criteria. 
ACAT II cost thresholds are $185 million (CY2014) for RDT&E or $835 million 
(CY2014) for procurement. ACAT III is any program that does not meet ACAT II criteria 
or above (DOD, 2020b). For all ACAT programs, the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) reserves the right to designate a program as a higher level ACAT program because 
of the program’s special interest, regardless of the cost criteria (DOD, 2020b).  
Regardless of ACAT designation, all defense acquisition programs are subject to 
achieving identified capability requirements, through the DAS, within budgetary 
constraints (DOD, 2020b). This relationship is known as the “Big A” acquisition process. 
It is used by the federal government to obtain new or maintain old resources or services for 
the DOD. Identifying the technological requirements that the military needs, formulating a 
budget, and acquiring the technology is formally known as the relationship between the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), and the DAS, respectively (see Figure 
4; DOD, 2020b).  
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Figure 4. The “Big A” Acquisition Process. Source: Mortlock (2017). 
∑ Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS): 
Identifies and validates warfighting requirements for the system and is a 
needs-driven process, meaning JCIDS is used when warfighters encounter 
a threat or capability gap that requires a solution (Mortlock, 2017). 
∑ Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE): Focuses 
on planning and allocating financial resources according to the approved 
fiscal year budget. PPBE is a schedule-driven process because the DOD 
budget is approved by Congress annually and appropriations plan their 
expenditures annually (Mortlock, 2017).   
∑ Defense Acquisition System (DAS): The management process that 
provides the system to the warfighter (also known as the “Little A” 
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Acquisition Process). The DAS is an event-driven process because 
developing a new technology requires the system to achieve the test and 
evaluation goals to meet the warfighter requirements validated in the 
JCIDS process (Mortlock, 2017).  
The overlapping relationship between the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes 
provides checks and balances within the “Big A” acquisition process. Although the goal is 
to provide warfighters with everything they need when they need it, realistic constraints 
like a limited budget and technology development are factors the “Big A” acquisition 
process considers to fulfill warfighter needs. As with any checks and balances systems, 
friction between each of the processes can occur, especially when each are driven by a 
different motivation, i.e., needs, schedule, or events.  
1. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development (JCIDS) 
The main guidance for the JCIDS process is Instruction 5123.01H, Charter of the 
JROC and Implementation of the JCIDS, dated August 31, 2018 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 
[JCS], 2018). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is a statutory council to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 181, 
they are responsible for assessing, identifying, approving, and prioritizing joint capability 
gaps to meet the obligations in the National Defense Strategy using the JCIDS process 
(JCS, 2018). The JROC also supports the CJCS with developing the secretary of defense’s 
(SECDEF) Defense Planning Guidance (DPG; JCS, 2018). By identifying, assessing, and 
prioritizing capability gaps in the operational environment, the JCIDS process can 
determine what kind of solution is needed to address the gap (Rausch, n.d.).  
The DOTMLPF-P acronym refers to various approaches to find a solution for 
capability gaps. DOTMLPF-P stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. An operational capability gap 
could be satisfied by a change in any of these categories (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2016). 
DOTMLPF-P categories are usually designated into materiel and non-materiel solutions. 
The JCIDS process resides within the materiel section of DOTMLPF-P and is only used 
when all non-materiel components have been considered and cannot provide a solution for 
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the capability gap the warfighter is experiencing (JCS, 2016). Each component of 
DOTMLPF-P is described in more detail below.  
∑ Doctrine: U.S. military forces are led by joint doctrine that address the 
fundamental principles in the way these forces fight for the objective, 
whether within a single service or within joint operations (JCS, 2016). 
Senior leaders will consider if there are better or more modern methods to 
maneuver and combine resources or update policies, laws, and treaties to 
address this operational gap (JCS, 2016).  
∑ Organization: Joint concepts are built upon organizational structures that, 
if changed, could address the capability gap experienced by the warfighter 
(JCS, 2016). The main question considered is if the unit, service, joint 
services, etc., has the organizational structure (i.e., personnel or funding) 
to execute the appropriate warfighting capability (JCS, 2016). 
∑ Training: Based off the joint doctrine, joint training is required to prepare 
forces for military operations and this component of DOTMLPF-P 
analyzes various training pipelines or exercises for potential solutions to 
capability gaps (JCS, 2016). In other words, could the gap be fulfilled with 
a modification to tactics, techniques, or training procedures (JCS, 2016)? 
∑ Materiel: After all other DOTMLPF-P categories have been considered, 
the JCIDS process evaluates warfighter requirements to determine if the 
gap can be fulfilled with potentially a new system (JCS, 2016). 
Oftentimes, a materiel solution is only considered if the capability gap 
poses an unacceptable level of risk that requires a new system so 
warfighters can achieve the mission (JCS, 2016).  
∑ Leadership and Education: This DOTMLPF-P component includes 
curriculums such as Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), 
Pinnacle and Capstone courses for general officers and flag officers, and 
the Keystone course for senior non-commissioned officers to prepare 
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leaders to think critically and support sound judgement in all environments 
(JCS, 2016). With leadership and education, military forces can think 
critically and attempt to fill capability gaps with available resources before 
proposing new acquisition programs that are costly and take time to 
develop (JCS, 2016).  
∑ Personnel: All operations require personnel, both military and civilian, 
with the appropriate skillsets to accomplish the mission (JCS, 2016). This 
component considers if the capability gap is caused by a lack of 
appropriately trained personnel in the proper positions to meet military 
objectives (JCS, 2016).  
∑ Facilities: Essential to supporting military operations, command 
installations and industrial buildings are examined to ensure the 
appropriate infrastructure is in place to deploy, receive, stage, move, 
integrate, and sustain military operations (JCS, 2016). 
∑ Policy: DOD, federal, or international policies that direct, task, prescribe, 
and guide the DOD in executing their mission for national security may 
influence how to approach solutions for capability gaps (JCS, 2016). This 
DOTMLPF-P component considers the intent of policies to certify that 
current and future solutions comply with their requirements (JCS, 2016) 
When the Services, combatant commands, agencies, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) identify an operational gap, they conduct a capabilities-based assessment that 
analyzes possible risk areas and shortfalls associated with the gap (Rausch, n.d.). They 
present a capability document—either an initial capabilities document (ICD) for a materiel 
solution or a DOTMLPF-P change recommendation for a non-materiel solution—to the 
JROC to initiate the JCIDS process (Rausch, n.d.). If the JROC approves the ICD, then a 
capability development document (CDD) for a materiel is developed, which is referenced 
and updated throughout the entire DAS (JCS, 2016). The CDD validates the key 
performance parameters (KPPs), which are the core technical objectives a program must 
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achieve. The JROC will consider the risks associated with cost, schedule, and technological 
maturity for achieving the given KPPs before approving the CDD (JCS, 2018). The JROC 
validated CDD is required for a program of record to enter Milestone B (MS B) and release 
the development Request for Proposal (RFP) to potential contract bidders (JCS, 2018). A 
CDD Update, formerly called the Capability Production Document (CPD), is a follow-on 
JROC validation that is required for a program to enter Milestone C (MS C) and initiate 
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP; JCS, 2018).  
2. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
The main guidance for the PPBE process is DOD Directive 7045.14, The Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, dated August 29, 2017 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2017). Within the AAF, PPBE process is responsible for 
the funding, financial management, and resource allocation of current and planned 
acquisition programs throughout every phase of the program’s life cycle (DOD, 2017). 
Overall, the goals of PPBE is to support the DOD with the resources they need to execute 
the National Defense Strategy while considering fiscal constraints (DOD, 2017). The 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), force development guidance, program guidance, and 
budget guidance steer the PPBE process to form budgets and programs annually and 
allocate funds quadrennially (DOD, 2017). The components of PPBE is described in 
further detail below. 
a. Planning  
To maintain the National Defense Strategy and support U.S. foreign policy, 
the planning phase tracks the priorities, affordability, risks, suitability, 
feasibility, and effectiveness of DOD resources (DOD, 2017). Led by the 
undersecretary of defense, the planning phase also analyzes the National 
Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy to align the Defense 
Planning Guidance with the goals of the administration (McGarry, 2020). 
The DPG considers potential threats, force organization, and readiness to 
guide the services as they develop their program objective memorandums 
(POMs; McGarry, 2020).  
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b. Programming 
The programming phase is where the DOD services develop their POMs 
that annotate their proposed resource requirements (DOD, 2017). The CJCS 
will review the POMs and conduct risk assessments on the proposed 
capabilities and the ability to fund them (DOD, 2017). The Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP) is updated after these risk assessments and the 
SECDEF can instruct the services to adjust their program objectives based 
off the FYDP (McGarry, 2020). 
c. Budgeting 
The DOD services will then develop a Budget Estimate Submission (BES) 
which is a proposed detailed budget of the program for the first year of the 
FYDP (DOD, 2017; McGarry, 2020). Resource requests are deconflicted 
among the services by the comptrollers, and then the SECDEF directs the 
services to update their budgets (McGarry, 2020). The updated BESs are 
then routed through the Office of Management and Budget and are included 
in the president’s annual budget request to Congress (McGarry, 2020). 
d. Execution 
In the execution phase, plans developed in the planning, programming, and 
budgeting phases are carried out by allocating the budgeted funds to the 
services (DOD, 2017). Program results are also reviewed in this phase by 
comparing a program’s actual performance with its planned performance, 
both financially and in terms of meeting warfighter needs (DOD, 2017).  
3. Defense Acquisition System  
Outlined in the AAF are several variations of the DAS that can be used to develop 
a program depending on program type and urgency (DOD, 2020a). This research will focus 
on the most traditional DAS path since the CH-53K program followed this path. In  
Figure 3, this traditional pathway is summarized in the third path labeled “Major Capability 
Acquisition” (DOD, 2020a). The major capability acquisition pathway is used to support 
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MDAPs and other complex acquisitions because it follows an analyze, design, develop, 
integrate, test, evaluate, produce, and support approach which is common for most defense 
acquisitions (DOD, 2020a). The other pathways annotated in Figure 3 are modified 
versions of the MDAPs path and are relevant for specific programs, i.e., software, services, 
rapid acquisitions, etc. (DOD, 2020a).  
The main guidance for the DAS is DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Adaptive Acquisition Framework, dated January 23, 2020 (DOD, 2020a). The traditional 
DAS within the AAF consists of five phases that encompass the entire life cycle of the 
system (see Figure 5). Those phases are Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), Technology 
Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR), Engineering Development and Manufacturing 
(EMD), Production and Development (P&D), and Operations and Support (O&S; DOD, 
2020b). Incorporated within those phases are seven major decision points that determine 
whether the system should proceed to the next step, remain in its current step for further 
development, or be discontinued. Those decision points, also outlined in Figure 5, are 
Materiel Development Decision (MDD), Milestone A (MS A), CDD Validation, 
Development Request for Proposal Release Decision (DRFPRD), Milestone B (MS B), 
Milestone C (MS C), and the Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision (DOD, 2020b). They 
are described in more detail below. 
 
Figure 5. Major Milestones and Decision Points Outlined in the Adaptive Acquisition 
Framework of the Defense Acquisition System. Source: DOD (2020b). 
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a. Materiel Development Decision  
The JROC validated ICD from the JCIDS is one of two components for the 
MDD (DOD, 2020b). The other component is an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) Study Guidance and Study Plan which will guide the AoA in the 
MSA phase (DOD, 2020b). With these two documents, the MDA 
determines at what milestone a particular initiative should enter in the AAF 
based on urgency, resources, and technological maturity (DOD, 2020b). In 
this case, initiative is used to delineate from the term program because 
acquisition programs are not established with statutory requirements until 
MS B or MS C (DOD, 2020b). The MDA will also determine the lead DOD 
Component for the initiative (DOD, 2020b).  
b. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
The AoA Study Guidance and Study Plan that was completed for the MDD 
is executed in the MSA phase (DOD, 2020b). The AoA considers the trade 
space between cost, schedule, performance, risk, suitability, and 
effectiveness of viable solutions that could fulfill the capability gap (DOD, 
2020b). This phase is designed to conduct the AoA by converting JROC 
validated capability gaps into system requirements (DOD, 2020b). These 
requirements are written as KPPs and key system attributes (KSAs), which 
further detail quantifiable performance measures the system should achieve 
by the time it is fully developed (DOD, 2020b). Combined with the ICD, 
KPPs and KSAs create a draft CDD that is repeatedly referenced and 
updated throughout the acquisition process (JCS, 2016). During the MSA, 
the program manager (PM) is selected and a program office is established 
to lead the system through the next steps of the acquisition cycle, either 
ultimately to the warfighter or to cancellation (DOD, 2020b).  
c. Milestone A  
At the MS A decision point, entry into the TMRR phase is approved by the 
MDA and finalized development RFPs are published to explain technical 
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and performance requirements to potential contractors who will bid for the 
contract (DOD, 2020b). This RFP is strictly for the technology development 
and risk reduction efforts; usually, other RFPs are issued to support EMD 
phases or P&D phases further in the DAS (DOD, 2020b).  
d. Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Phase 
TMRR is used to reduce any risks associated with the development of a new 
program, such as technology, engineering, integration, and life-cycle costs, 
before large-scale production (DOD, 2020b). Prototypes may be developed, 
tested, and refined to create a sufficient design solution that achieves the 
requirements and considers the trade space between cost and capability 
(DOD, 2020b). The results of the prototype or technology demonstrations 
are outlined in a preliminary design review (PDR), which validates that the 
proposed system design is ready for engineering and manufacturing 
development (DOD, 2020b).  
e. Capability Development Document Validation 
Within the TMRR phase, the draft CDD developed during the MSA phase 
is updated and validated when the program’s requirements are determined 
technically achievable, affordable, and testable (DOD, 2020b). The CDD 
describes the system’s KPPs and KSAs to provide guidance for the 
upcoming DRFPRD and PDR before MS B (DOD, 2020). 
f. Development Request for Proposal Release Decision  
The DRFPRD is a critical decision that determines whether a system’s 
capability requirements, affordability, and executability are feasible (DOD, 
2020b). The DRFPRD authorizes RFPs for the EMD phase, which the 
remaining contractors will bid on for the EMD contract (DOD, 2020b).  
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g. Milestone B  
MS B initiates the EMD phase and authorizes the awarding of an EMD 
contract (DOD, 2020b). This decision point is a final demonstration that 
program risks, such as technology, engineering, integration, manufacturing, 
sustainment, and affordability, have been mitigated (DOD, 2020b). An 
approved MS B decision officially initiates the program with an Acquisition 
Program Baseline and commits fiscal resources to the system (DOD, 
2020b). An MDA approved APB is the main document that tracks the cost, 
schedule, and performance of the program (DOD, 2020b). 
h. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
The EMD phase is when the system is developed, built, and tested to ensure 
all KPPs and other requirements are attained to support production and 
deployment of the system (DOD, 2020b). This includes all hardware and 
software designs and may require several rounds of testing to solidify a 
stable design (DOD, 2020b). EMD can include both developmental testing 
and evaluation (DT&E) and operational testing and evaluation (OT&E; 
DOD, 2020b). DT&E focuses on the system’s compliance to its technical 
specifications, KPPs, and requirements (DOD, 2020b). OT&E concentrates 
on the system’s effectiveness, suitability, and survivability for the 
warfighter’s identified capability gap (DOD, 2020b). By the end of the 
EMD phase, the program should have a stable design, meet the requirements 
outlined in the CDD, and have demonstrated consistent manufacturing 
processes for the upcoming production phase (DOD, 2020b). 
i. Milestone C  
The purpose of the Milestone C (MS C) decision is to demonstrate that the 
program’s technical design is stable and will meet all operational 
requirements, manufacturing risks are mitigated, and software development 
is deemed mature (DOD, 2020b). A validated CDD Update is required at 
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the MS C decision to guide the program through the production phase 
(DOD, 2020b).  
j. Production and Deployment Phase 
The P&D phase is intended to produce and deliver a usable system to the 
warfighter (DOD, 2020b). The system will undergo several events in this 
phase, starting with low rate initial production (LRIP)—where a small 
number of systems are produced and deployed to conduct further testing 
(DOD, 2020b). Various types of OT&E, including initial operational test 
and evaluation (IOT&E) and live-fire test and evaluation (LFT&E), are 
conducted with the LRIP systems to determine the system’s performance 
capability in an operational capacity (DOD, 2020b). During this phase, the 
MDA will evaluate the system to determine readiness for full rate 
production (DOD, 2020b).  
k. Full Rate Production Decision Point (Full Deployment Decision Point for 
IT Systems) 
After analyzing results from OT&E, initial manufacturing, and operational 
performance with the LRIP articles, the MDA will decide whether the 
program acceptably meets its system requirements to proceed to FRP 
(DOD, 2020b). The FRP decision leads to IOC and eventually Full 
Operational Capability (FOC; DOD, 2020b). 
l. Operations and Support Phase 
The O&S phase is when the system is fully deployed to the warfighter and 
must be maintained and sustained throughout its life cycle (DOD, 2020b). 
This is most expensive phase throughout the program’s life cycle (see 
Figure 6). The O&S phase concludes with the proper disposal of the system 
at the end of its useful life (DOD, 2020b). 
 Costs are not distributed evenly throughout a program’s life cycle. Figure 6 depicts 
the expected cost profile over the course of program’s life cycle in relation to the five 
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phases in the DAS (OSD, 2014). Funding for each of these phases does not all come from 
the same appropriation throughout the acquisition life cycle. Although there are numerous 
appropriations for specific needs, the acquisition process operates and reports its cost 
estimations in three main appropriations: RDT&E, procurement, and operating and support 
(O&S). RDT&E funds are used for the program’s testing and development activities (i.e., 
during the early development phases and any testing evaluations conducted throughout the 
acquisition process; Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2014). Procurement funds 
are used when the program is approved for the MS C decision and can commence 
production, either for LRIP or FRP (OSD, 2014). O&S funds are consequently used during 
the operations and support phase (OSD, 2014). Other appropriations that could be utilized 
during the acquisition life cycle are operations and maintenance (O&M), military 
construction (MILCON), and military personnel (MILPERS). O&M is used in relation to 




Figure 6. Program Life Cycle Cost Profile in Relation to the DAS phases. Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(2014). 
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B. PART II: THE CH-53K HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTER PROGRAM 
The following sections of this chapter provide a brief background on the CH-53K 
by explaining where it came from and where it is headed. Once completed, the CH-53K 
will be the most powerful heavy-lift helicopter in the world (Snow, 2019). Improved 
maintainability and reliability will significantly decrease operating costs and increase 
operational effectiveness (DOD, 2018). With the CH-53K in their arsenal, the USMC will 
be able to meet their heavy-lift requirements in extreme temperatures and environmental 
conditions, so they can continue their role as a rapidly deployable, first-to-the-fight force.  
1. History of the CH-53 
The Heavy Helicopter Experimental (HHX) program was initiated in 1962 by the 
U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Naval Weapons in the hopes of designing an aircraft capable of 
assault transport, personnel transport, aircraft recovery, and casualty evacuations (Fort 
Worth Aviation Museum, 2015). Sikorsky won the contract, and within 4.5 years, the first 
CH-53A arrived in Vietnam (see Figure 7; Fort Worth Aviation Museum, 2015).  
 
Figure 7. CH-53A/D Sea Stallion in Vietnam. Source: Naval History and 
Heritage Command (2014).  
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, various versions of the CH-53 were produced for 
the different services and for several countries. The Air Force favored the HH-53B for its 
more powerful engines and digital electronics and countermeasures capability, which were 
useful during combat search and rescue missions (Schuster, 2012). The USMC quickly 
upgraded to the CH-53D in 1970, which incorporated the HH-53B’s engines without the 
additional digital electronics and countermeasures equipment to allow for a heavier lifting 
capacity (Schuster, 2012). Israel acquired the CH-53D, and Germany introduced the CH-
53G—a CH-53D variant—in the early 1970s, which are expected to last until the 2030s 
(Freedberg & Egozi, 2019; Lockheed Martin, n.d.). When the CH-53K began, both 
countries were interested in acquiring a new heavy-lift helicopter. Sikorsky’s CH-53K and 
Boeing’s CH-47F are suitable candidates to fulfill their needs. 
The CH-53E (see Figure 8) is the USMC’s current heavy-lift helicopter that has 
been in service since 1980. Its design incorporated a third engine, which further increased 
the aircraft’s lift capacity (Fort Worth Aviation Museum, 2015). As the aircraft aged, the 
USMC initiated the Heavy Lift Replacement program in 2003, which eventually developed 
into the CH-53K program. In 2007, the USMC started replacing their older CH-53D 
aircraft with the MV-22 Osprey, which accomplishes the same or similar missions with its 
tiltrotor design (Fort Worth Aviation Museum, 2015). As the CH-53K begins to reach the 
squadrons, the USMC will need to reassess their implementation of both the CH-53K and 
the MV-22, since they have similar mission sets (see section titled RAND in Chapter III).  
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Figure 8. CH-53E Super Stallion lands on the flight deck of U.S.S. Bataan 
(LHD 5) Source: Eckstein (2019a). 
2. CH-53K Mission and Capability 
The USMC initiated the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement program to address their 
critical shortage of heavy-lift aircraft as the CH-53E aged and as modern weapon systems 
became increasingly heavier (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011b). The goal 
for the CH-53K is to exceed the CH-53E’s performance in lift and range capabilities, 
commonality, reliability, maintainability, interoperability, ship integration, survivability, 
and force protection (Perrin, 2018). 
The director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), listed the following 
mission capabilities for the CH-53K:  
∑ heavy-lift missions, including assault transport of weapons, equipment, 
supplies, and troops 
∑ support for forward arming and refueling points and rapid ground 
refueling 
∑ assault support in evacuation and maritime special operations 
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∑ casualty evacuation 
∑ recovery of downed aircraft, equipment, and personnel  
∑ airborne control for assault support (Behler, 2019) 
With its triple-hook external cargo system, the CH-53K can either carry heavy 
ground equipment—such as the HMMWV, LAV, and  JLTV—or three independent supply 
loads that can be easily delivered to three separate locations without reconfiguration 
(Marines, n.d.; United States Navy, 2019). Internal cargo loading is also compatible with 
fixed-wing configurations, so supply pallets offloading from fixed-wing aircraft and onto 
the CH-53K require no reconfiguration (Marines, n.d.).  
Compared to its predecessor, the CH-53K is slightly larger, but has the same 
shipboard footprint and a reduced logistical footprint to make the aircraft easier to maintain 
(see Figure 9). The slightly larger cabin of the CH-53K allows for not only larger supply 
pallets but also an internally loaded HMMWV to be transported by the aircraft which 
provides additional flexibility in military operations (U.S. Navy, n.d.). Figure 9 highlights 
other technological advances found in the CH-53K, such as the modern glass cockpit, fly-
by-wire controls, and composite main rotor blades designed to provided more lift than the 
CH-53E (U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). Additionally, the CH-53K’s engines are built 
with 63% fewer parts but provide 57% more horsepower than the CH-53E to provide more 
lift and simplify maintenance procedures (U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). A more 
detailed comparison of the CH-53K’s capabilities regarding the CH-53E is provided in 
Figure 10.  
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Figure 9. Upgraded Features of CH-53K within Equivalent Shipboard 




Figure 10. CH-53K Compared to CH-53E. Source: U.S. Marine Corps 
Aviation (2019). 
Although a heavier aircraft, the CH-53K is clearly a more advanced and capable aircraft 
compared to its predecessor which will help the USMC meet their increasing demands for 
heavy-lift capability (GAO, 2011b).  
3. Operational Deployment 
The CH-53 aircraft is designed to be organized into four squadron configurations 
that must be manned, trained, and equipped appropriately to execute the mission (U.S. 
Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). These four configurations are the 16-aircraft squadrons 
(1.0), 12-aircraft temporary squadrons (.75), 8-aircraft squadron minus (.5), and 4-aircraft 
detachments (.25; U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). A 1.0 squadron is a squadron 
Capabilities CH-53K CH-53E
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Max Gross Weight 88,000 lbs 73,500 lbs
Useful Internal Payload 16,900lbs 13,200 lbs
Useful External Payload 27,000 lbs 15,000 lbs
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operating at full capacity and can execute a .5 and two .25 missions simultaneously (U.S. 
Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). With only 142 CH-53E aircraft in the USMC inventory in 
2019, most 1.0 squadrons are operating as .75 squadrons as the CH-53E continues to age 
(U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). The CH-53K’s 2005 APB called for 156 aircraft and 
then was officially updated to 200 aircraft in the 2013 APB when the USMC adopted a 
force restructure plan to increase their personnel numbers by 28,000 Marines (GAO, 
2011a). These 200 CH-53K aircraft will reincorporate the 1.0 squadron composition 
capability along with smaller squadrons by consisting of 
∑ eight active Marine heavy helicopter (HMH) squadrons with 16 aircraft 
each,  
∑ two reserve HMH squadrons with eight aircraft each, and 
∑ one HMH training (MHMT) squadron with 21 aircraft. (U.S. Marine 
Corps Aviation, 2019) 
With this composition, the USMC anticipates 165 of their 200 CH-53K’s fully operating 
at any given time while 35 aircraft can undergo maintenance without disrupting the 
operational tempo. The USMC will likely request more aircraft after the CH-53K is fully 
operational. Often, these additional aircraft requests appear on an unfunded requirements 
list; however, the USMC has already anticipated requesting another 20 aircraft in their 30-
year plan (Gertler, 2018). 
 Transition from the CH-53E to the CH-53K will take approximately 18 months for 
each squadron (U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). The USMC plans for the first CH-53K 
Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) to enact change of operational control (CHOP) in 
fiscal year (FY) 2024, which will set standard operating procedures with the new aircraft 
(2019 U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). Although the CH-53K procurement quantity 
increased to 200 aircraft because of a USMC force restructure, the requirement for 200 
aircraft remained even when the USMC conducted a follow-on force restructure that called 
for a decrease in 20,000 Marines (GAO, 2012). As the CH-53K emerges during the USMC 
personnel downsizing, it is essential for the USMC to assign trained personnel to the 
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appropriate billets to ensure a smooth transition. Therefore, the USMC established CH-
53K–specific military occupational specialties for pilots (7511) and enlisted maintenance 
personnel and aircrew (6053) in FY2018 to identify qualified Marines for critical billets 
(U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to familiarize the reader with the additional 
reports published on or about the CH-53K by government and non-government entities. 
The main parties featured in this chapter are the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Office of the Inspector General (IG), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Research 
and Development (RAND) Corporation. The GAO, IG, and CBO are independent 
organizations designed to examine federal agencies and provide objective feedback to 
improve efficiency. The GAO focuses primarily on the use of taxpayer dollars on behalf 
of Congress (GAO, n.d.). The IG is an office within the DOD that investigates matters 
regarding law violations and audits on government agencies (Office of the Inspector 
General, n.d.). The CBO analyzes budgetary and economic issues to provide reports and 
cost estimations that aid in the congressional budget process (Congressional Budget Office, 
n.d.). In contrast to the independent, government-affiliated GAO, IG, and CBO, the RAND 
Corporation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that analyzes how public policy 
decisions impact world issues in security, health, education, sustainability, growth, and 
development (RAND, n.d.). On several occasions, the DOD has hired RAND to conduct 
research on the utilization of military assets and their respective costs. 
A. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE  
In April 2011, the GAO conducted a study of the CH-53K program, specifically 
analyzing changes in the program’s cost, schedule, and ability to meet the warfighter’s 
needs. The report analyzed the changes made to the program since its inception in 2005 
and determined that most cost increases and schedule delays were due to the USMC’s 
quantity increase from 156 to 200 aircraft (GAO, 2011b). Early delays were a result of 
miscommunication between the program office and Sikorsky about systems engineering 
requirements, difficulties with staffing both offices, and starting development before 
establishing a plan that achieved program requirements under the given DOD constraints 
(GAO, 2011b). Since costs increased approximately $6.8 billion from 2005 to 2011, mostly 
attributed to the quantity increase, the program office cut costs by postponing three 
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performance capabilities and easing two maintenance technical specifications (GAO, 
2011b). The three deferred capabilities were Link-16, variable message format, and Mode 
V which are all communications metrics that will be incorporated after the CH-53K’s IOC 
(GAO, 2011b). The relaxed maintenance specifications were time requirements for mean 
time to repair and mean corrective maintenance time for operational mission failures 
(GAO, 2011b). Although potential solutions were proposed by Sikorsky to meet these 
specifications, the program office determined these specifications were not worth 
achieving at the expense of other program requirements and cost effectiveness (GAO, 
2011b).  
The acquisition life cycle recommends that the PDR, which validates that the 
proposed system is ready for development with an acceptable level of risk, should be 
completed within the TMRR phase, either before or after the DFRPRD, both of which are 
prior to Milestone B. The CH-53K program’s original PDR date was set approximately 18 
months after Milestone B, when the program had already started development, and then 
was delayed another 15 months (GAO, 2011b). GAO (2011b) attributes these delays to ill-
defined requirements that caused confusion between the program office, the warfighter, 
and Sikorsky. In one case, the program office struggled to define software specifications 
for the avionics management system (GAO, 2011b). The program office noted how the use 
of a firm-fixed price (FFP) contract with Sikorsky’s subcontractor Rockwell Collins for 
the avionics management system proved difficult to update, and adapting software 
specifications was also a challenge (GAO, 2011b). FFP contracts are typically used when 
the system is well-defined and has easily computable costs. The contractor assumes all the 
risk in these types of contracts since the DOD sets a fixed price of payment for the contract. 
Therefore, it is the sole responsibility of the contractor to minimize costs in order to make 
a profit (FAR 16.202, 2019). When the CH-53K avionics management system experienced 
design changes, the subcontractor was reluctant to implement changes for fear of driving 
up costs beyond the FFP, which led to further schedule delays. A consolidated list of 
subcontractors for the CH-53K main systems is provided in Appendix B.  
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Another example was confusion between the program office and Sikorsky about 
how the CH-53K should be C-5 aircraft transportable. Like its predecessor, the main 
gearbox and rotor of the CH-53K needs to be removed for the aircraft to fit within the C-
5. However, the program office’s intentions were that all aircraft components should travel 
within one C-5 aircraft, while the Sikorsky interpreted that the CH-53K body would 
transport in one C-5 while its gearbox and main rotor would transport in another (GAO, 
2011b). This KPP was interpreted incorrectly by the contractor because the government 
did not translate the operational requirement into design specifications correctly, resulting 
in an ill-defined requirement (GAO, 2011b). Ultimately, the miscommunication was 
addressed, and the program proceeded under the program office’s KPP requirement; 
however, this scheduling conflict resulted in cost increases during development.  
The two relaxed KPPs were related to mean time to repair and mean corrective 
maintenance time for operational mission failure requirements that were deemed no longer 
cost effective for the program. Both metrics are a measure of the average amount of time 
required for the aircraft to be nonoperational for either repairs or maintenance. For instance, 
the CH-53K’s two-piece rotor blade components require an excessive amount of time for 
the adhesive to secure, making the design not compliant to the original KPP. The proposed 
solution was to design a one-piece blade to minimize repair time; however, this solution 
increases the footprint of the aircraft on-board naval ships and drives up O&S costs by $99 
per flight hour (GAO, 2011b). The trade-off for the program manager, after consultation 
with the warfighter/requirement community, was either to relax the time requirement or to 
increase costs throughout the program’s life cycle. The USMC chose to relax the time 
requirement.  
The 2011 GAO report found that the IOC’s nearly 3-year schedule delay from 
September 2015 to June 2018 would result in a deficit of approximately 50 heavy-lift 
helicopters for the following 7 years as the CH-53E approached the end of its life cycle 
(GAO, 2011b). Since the report was published, the IOC date was pushed back two more 
times, ultimately to 2021.  
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B. INSPECTOR GENERAL  
The DOD IG conducted a series of two audits assessing the acquisition 
management of the CH-53K. In their first report, titled Increased Procurement Quantity 
for CH-53K Helicopter Not Justified, they investigated how the USMC changed their 
procurement quantity from 156 to 200 aircraft, resulting in an additional $22.2 billion in 
anticipated procurement funding needs without adequate operational need or support from 
the appropriate authorities (IG, 2013a). The IG’s second report, titled CH-53K Program 
Management Is Satisfactory, But Risks Remain, was published 5 months later and 
concluded that Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) was effectively managing the 
program in accordance with defense acquisition guidelines, but technical challenges and 
postponed testing dates could result in additional cost growth and schedule delays (IG, 
2013b).  
The IG’s concerns in the first report stemmed not from the increased procurement 
quantity itself but the lack of documentation the USMC could provide to justify their 
additional 44 aircraft. The IG concluded that Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) 
Department of Aviation did not follow the JCIDS approval process, failed to conduct 
studies that balanced operational need with affordability, incorrectly used the 2008 
memorandum from the deputy commandant for aviation and the 2010–2011 Force 
Structure Review as justification for the procurement increase, and neglected to consider 
the impacts of the downsizing of personnel strength in the USMC (IG, 2013a). The USMC 
did not concur with any of the IG’s findings.  
The JCIDS process is used to identify capability gaps and solutions while 
considering program affordability and technological maturity (IG, 2013a). Part of the 
JCIDS process for any program is obtaining validation from the JROC for program 
requirements and capability documents, including procurement quantity increases. The 
USMC did not obtain direct JROC approval for the additional 44 aircraft but justified their 
increase with the JROC-approved CDD from December 2004, which delegated approval 
authority to the USMC for all non-KPP changes (IG, 2013a). The procurement increase 
was also approved by the MDA when the program requested a revised baseline in April 
2013 (IG, 2013a). Despite these approvals, the IG concluded that these actions did not 
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justify the increased quantity in accordance with the 2012 JCIDS, which asserts that 
programs should obtain revalidation from the JROC if they experience cost growth or 
quantity deviation greater than 10% (IG, 2013a). The increase from 156 to 200 aircraft 
resulted in about a 30% increase in quantity and a 54% increase in procurement cost (IG, 
2013a). The USMC stated that the JROC did approve the USMC’s plan to maintain nine 
active HMH squadrons (eventually changed to eight active and one reserve squadron) with 
16 aircraft each and appropriate support aircraft, establishing the 200-aircraft quantity in 
the November 2007 brief titled USMC Grow the Force Aviation Requirements (IG, 2013a). 
Another concern raised by the IG report was the lack of studies conducted by the 
USMC to justify their quantity increase. The report specifically addresses the 2006 Navy 
and USMC seabasing study—which did not include aircraft quantities—and the Marine 
Aviation Requirements Study (MARS), which was fiscally unconstrained and neglected 
aircraft quantities for training, backup, and attrition (IG, 2013a). The USMC argued that 
the approved nine HMH squadrons with 16 aircraft, for a total of 144 mission aircraft, 
logically resulted in a 200-aircraft procurement to include training, back-up, and attrition 
quantities. Additionally, the USMC noted that OPNAV Instruction 5442.8 authorized 
enough back-up aircraft to total a procurement quantity of 215 aircraft, but HQMC 
Department of Aviation accepted a lower quantity due to fiscal constraints (IG, 2013a). 
The deputy commandant for aviation indicated the increase to 200 aircraft also 
aligned with the increase in USMC end strength to 202,000 Marines (IG, 2013a). However, 
a few years later, the USMC ultimately changed direction and planned to reduce end 
strength to 182,100 Marines by the end of FY2016 (IG, 2013a). IG officials questioned the 
USMC decision to maintain the 200 aircraft procurement even after the reduction in 
personnel. The USMC responded that end strength does not linearly correlate with aircraft 
procurement quantities and that operational commitments have remained the same, despite 
the decrease in manpower (IG, 2013a). Additionally, the number of Marines that make up 
a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) or MEU has not been affected by the end strength 
reduction (IG, 2013a). Furthermore, the CH-53K’s primary mission for the MEB or MEU 
is not troop transport but equipment and vehicle transport; thus it cannot be correlated 
directly to end strength (IG, 2013a).  
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Five months later, the IG published their second audit of this series, stating that the 
program was being managed effectively and in accordance with defense acquisition 
guidelines (IG, 2013b). Their report concluded that program officials made appropriate 
decisions regarding technical milestones and testing, accurately reported cost growth and 
delays to the USD(AT&L) and Congress, and obtained the necessary acquisition program 
baseline (APB) approval to address their cost growth and schedule delay challenges (IG, 
2013b). The primary concern raised by the IG report was the potential for future cost 
growth and schedule setbacks because of delayed testing (IG, 2013b). 
The CH-53K program experienced its first significant schedule delay and APB 
update in 2010, when the program realized their original schedule was overly aggressive 
and was not conducive to meeting development goals (Naval Technology, n.d.-b). Initial 
flight testing was delayed for over a year because of technical deficiencies identified by 
the contractor, including component failures and contractor manufacturing challenges (IG, 
2013b). Although these delays incurred additional cost growth, the IG report indicated that 
these were appropriate decisions considering the program’s technical maturity (IG, 2013b). 
They also noted that these decisions were made in accordance with DOD Instruction 
5000.2 (OUSD[AT&L], 2003), which encourages an event-driven process by requiring 
tests to be conducted when the system achieves its entrance criteria (IG, 2013b).  
From January 2009 through July 2012, the program office submitted four program 
deviation reports to the USD(AT&L) reporting their experienced cost growth and schedule 
delays resulting from an aggressive original schedule, design challenges, increased 
procurement quantity, and better cost-estimating methods, respectively (IG, 2013b). 
Cumulatively, these factors caused the cost increases shown in Figure 11. Although 
approximately $22.2 billion of the $35.8 billion total life cycle cost increase can be 
attributed to the increase in procurement and O&S costs of the 44 additional aircraft, IG 
officials were concerned that this program saw significant cost increases prior to starting 
any flight testing (IG, 2013a, 2013b). The lack of testing up to this point also meant that 
the program’s critical technologies (i.e., the main gearbox and main rotor blades) had not 
demonstrated performance in an operational environment (IG, 2013b). Best practices 
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encourage a demonstration of successful performance for critical technologies prior to 
entering LRIP to prevent unnecessary cost growth and schedule setbacks.  
 
Figure 11. Comparison of 2005 and 2013 APB Costs. Source: IG (2013b). 
 The IG report also expressed concerns regarding the program’s plan to conduct 
testing and production concurrently. In May 2013, the program office signed a $435.5 
million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification with Sikorsky to produce four system 
demonstration test articles (SDTA) aircraft with delivery of the first aircraft due September 
2016  (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020). These production-representative aircraft were 
to be used for initial operation and evaluation (IO&E), but ordering them while the program 
was still in its EMD phase risked increased costs and schedule delays if deficiencies were 
found while the aircraft were in production (IG, 2013b). Program officials indicated to the 
IG that this concurrency would only cause problems if the SDTA delivery dates were 
delayed, and if delivery delays occurred, they would likely impact IOC dates as well (IG, 
2013b). 
C. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE  
In January 2020, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a report on the 
cost of replacing the current naval aviation fleet in both size and capability through 2050. 
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Their projections anticipated that procurement costs through 2030 will average $11 billion, 
about 20% less than what we experienced in the 2010s (Trunkey et al., 2020). From 2030 
to 2032, average procurement costs are expected to drop significantly, to an average of $7 
billion per year due to completion of current purchases such as the F-35B/C, MV-22B, and 
the CH-53K (Trunkey et al., 2020). This drop in costs corresponds with the end of the 
average 30-year cycle in which the Department of the Navy (DON) will have replaced their 
entire fleet of approximately 4,000 aircraft (Trunkey et al., 2020). 
 The combined procurement costs of fighter/attack aircraft and the USMC’s combat 
helicopters and tiltrotors make up more than 80% of the CBO’s projected costs through 
2050 (Trunkey et al., 2020). Replacement costs at the end of their respective service lives 
for the MV-22B, UH-1Y, AH-1W/Z, and CH-53E are projected at approximately $120 
billion (FY2018 dollars), with the CH-53K leading the way for greatest cost per aircraft 
(Trunkey et al., 2020). For procurement alone, the CH-53K is expected to cost $19 billion 
(FY2018) from 2020 to 2028 and another $10 billion (FY2018) to replace the first 85 
aircraft in the 2040s after its 25-year service life, as shown in Figure 4 (Trunkey et al., 
2020).  
 
Figure 12. Procurement Costs of CH-53K Compared to MV-22B through 
2050. Source: Trunkey et al. (2020). 
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The MV-22B will likely be replaced with a modified version of the same airframe, while 
the replacements for the AH-1Z and UH-1Y are based on the USMC interest in the Army’s 
future long-range assault aircraft (FLRAA; Trunkey et al., 2020). 
As of June 2018, the DON had 142 CH-53E helicopters with an average age of 30.2 
years, and its youngest aircraft at 18 years old (Trunkey et al., 2020). The rapidly aging 
CH-53E and its role as the only heavy-lift helicopter in the DON is evidence of its need for 
replacement. However, balancing the CH-53E exceeding costs along with the other mission 
capability needs has posed a challenging future for the DON.  
D. RAND CORPORATION 
Seabasing is a military strategy designed to rapidly assemble Naval forces 
anywhere in the world when overseas bases or support from allies are limited (Parker, 
2010). To strategically project power while remaining flexible in their operations, the 
USMC uses a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) that is composed of surface ships, 
ship-to-shore craft, and airlift capability that is based on this seabasing strategy. In 2010, 
RAND published an analysis of alternatives for the composition of the MPF, which the 
USMC references as the Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF[F]; Button et al., 
2010). 
The official definition of seabasing, as defined by the 2005 Joint Integrating 
Concept, is “the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-
employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, 
sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary forces without reliance on land 
bases” (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 5). The USMC adopted seabasing as part of their 
21st century amphibious warfare vision but has been largely unsuccessful in executing this 
concept since foreign policy demands shifted from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Parker, 2010). Despite setbacks, the USMC is still moving towards this seabasing 
construct, especially as they consider possibilities for their MPF(F), and the CH-53K, with 
its superior heavy-lift capabilities, would be a critical asset to the success of this future 
strategy.  
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An ideal MPF(F) structure would be a 14-ship strike group joint operation between 
the USMC, U.S. Navy, and Military Sealift Command comprised of  
∑ 2 LHA replacements, or LHA(R) 
∑ 1 landing helicopter deck (LHD) 
∑ 3 Lewis and Clark–class (T-AKE) cargo ships 
∑ 3 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LSMR) sealift ships 
∑ 3 mobile landing platform (MLP) ships 
∑ 2 MPF ships (Button et al., 2010) 
Although effective, this composition is expensive and has affected the military’s 
ability to fulfill other mission requirements. Alternatives for the MPF(F), proposed by 
RAND researchers, attempted to keep the operational capabilities intact while downsizing 
the assets required. One solution determined that eliminating an LHA(R) ship could be 
compensated by replacing the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft with CH-53K helicopters (Button et 
al., 2010). This solution results in a gain of about three times the lift capacity with the CH-
53K without sacrificing speed of external cargo transport (Button et al., 2010). The 
drawback is the lost speed from the faster MV-22 when it doesn’t have an external load, 
typically during casualty evacuation situations when time is critical (Button et al., 2010). 
The CH-53K replacements for the MV-22 are not capable of counteracting the effect of 
eliminating both LHA(R) ships; however, using other platforms like the landing craft air 
cushion (LCAC) in conjunction with the CH-53K would maintain the same level of cargo 
transport capacity and save $5 billion in acquisition costs (Button et al., 2010). As 
demonstrated in this study, the uniqueness of the CH-53K’s lift capacity makes the aircraft 
a necessity to operational forces while effectively reducing costs.  
Another RAND study titled Warfighting and Logistics Support of Joint Forces from 
the Joint Sea Base, investigated the possibilities of modifying the CH-53K to MV-22 
aircraft ratio in the MPF(F) (Button et al., 2007). Since the MV-22 and CH-53K can 
execute similar assault support missions, it seems redundant to develop the CH-53K when 
the MV-22 is already at FOC (Giordano, 2009). The advantage the MV-22 has over the 
CH-53K is its ability to travel over-the-horizon distances in fixed-wing aircraft mode at 
twice the speed of a helicopter, rapidly switch to helicopter mode, and transport Marines 
directly to the battlespace in seconds (Giordano, 2009). However, when the MV-22 uses 
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its external cargo hook to carry its load, it loses its speed advantage over the CH-53K and 
only carries half the weight (Button et al., 2007). The CH-53K’s aerial refueling capability 
allows it to achieve the same distance, albeit slower, but with more cargo, as the MV-22 
(Giordano, 2009). In other words, the MV-22 is better suited for quick personnel 
movements, while the CH-53K is ideal for heavy-lift missions (Button et al., 2007). After 
analyzing a variety of different scenarios for MPF(F) needs, the RAND study concluded it 
would be advantageous to increase the CH-53K to MV-22 ratio as they foresee a greater 
need for heavy cargo transport with average speed personnel delivery over rapid personnel 
delivery with minimal cargo (Button et al., 2007).  
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
As required by 10 U.S.C. § 231a, the SECDEF submits an annual, long-term 
aviation plan that includes the military Services’ fixed-wing, rotary-wing, manned, and 
unmanned aircraft for the next 30 years (DOD, 2018). Until the Pentagon discontinued the 
publication of this 30-year aviation plan in 2019, the plan provided foresight for budget 
planning and an inventory check for the approximate 14,000 aircraft flown by the DOD 
services (Sherman, 2019). The most recent published report covered FY2019–2048 and 
was based on the FY2019 President’s Budget and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 
which emphasized the need to counter threats in the Asia Pacific and European theaters 
while maintaining nuclear deterrence (DOD, 2018). Funding estimates in this report 
include RDT&E, procurement, O&M, MILPERS, and MILCON costs required to maintain 
and operate the aviation inventory.  
The aviation funding plan highlights the benefits of the CH-53K transition because 
of its significantly decreased operating cost, aircraft efficiency, and operational 
effectiveness compared to its predecessor. The quantity requested of the CH-53K is 20 
aircraft short of the requirement set by the capabilities production document (CPD). The 
CPD inventory requirement is calculated to maintain operational effectiveness of the 
squadrons while the individual aircraft undergo their standard O&M cycles. By procuring 
less than the 220 aircraft indicated by the CPD requirement, the CH-53K will experience 
inventory challenges like its predecessor (DOD, 2018). However, acknowledging the 
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inventory procurement deficit in the 30-year aviation plan instead of merely on the 
unfunded requirements list indicates to many analysts that the USMC intends to fulfill this 
CPD requirement with a future procurement (Gertler, 2018). 
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IV. CASE HISTORY 
On a cold afternoon in mid-January 2020, USMC Colonel Matthew Cruise sat in 
his office thinking about the events of the last few months. Cruise had been program 
manager (PM) of the CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter for the last two years and 
the last several months had been the most challenging period in this tenure yet. Before 
Cruise arrived, the program had passed its Milestone C decision and was approved for low-
rate-initial production. Since then, poor testing performance and several design changes 
had repeatedly delayed the CH-53K’s initial operational capability (IOC) date to the 
warfighter. In December 2018, the program was tracking 126 technical deficiencies that 
required solutions to support a deployable configuration (Perrin, 2018). The most 
concerning of these deficiencies was a common problem for rotary aircraft called engine 
gas re-ingestion which can cause engines to stall mid-flight due to lack of clean air running 
through the engine (Eckstein, 2019b). Last month, a year after the engine gas re-ingestion 
issue was reported, Cruise’s team finally found a deployable solution. 
Despite this monumental program success, Cruise was still being pressured to 
provide answers to his superiors. Cruise ran his fingers through his hair at his desk with a 
heavy sigh and decided it was time to get input from his staff so he could write a lessons 
learned review of the program. After Cruise gathered everyone in the conference room, he 
posed the main question to them: Why had this program repeatedly failed to keep its 
baselines?  
A. BACKGROUND 
The CH-53K program, originally called the Heavy Lift Replacement program, was 
initiated in September 2003 after the USMC decided they needed an upgrade to their 
rapidly aging heavy-lift helicopter fleet (Perrin, 2019). Unique within the USMC aircraft 
inventory at the turn of the century, the CH-53E was the only helicopter capable of carrying 
three quarters of all USMC equipment from sea to shore (Laatsch, 2003). As the CH-53E 
aged (average age of operational CH-53E aircraft is 32.6 years) and equipment had gotten 
heavier, it became essential for the USMC to acquire a more capable heavy-lift helicopter 
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to meet the logistical demands of future ship-to-shore operations (Laatsch, 2003; Reim, 
2018). At the 2019 Senate Armed Services Seapower Committee, Lieutenant General 
Steven Rudder stated,  
If we look at the future of what this nation is going to have to do with the 
[National Defense Strategy] and distributed operations, you’re going to 
need logistics; you’re going to need heavy lift because we’re going to be 
distributed, we’re going to be eating a lot of gas, using up a lot of ordnance; 
and [the CH-53K] is going to be the ship-to-shore connector that’s going to 
do it for us. There’s nothing else out there in the inventory. (Defense Info, 
2019) 
Although the USMC was in dire need of a new heavy-lift helicopter, the program 
experienced many significant setbacks as it tried to produce an aircraft with three times the 
lifting capacity within the same shipboard logistical footprint. Many of these setbacks were 
the result of poor testing performance, which led to significant cost increases and numerous 
schedule delays. Figure 13 provides an abbreviated timeline of events for the CH-53K 
program; a full timeline is provided in Appendix A. Figure 14 is a calendar view of the 
program’s major events from its 2019 Selected Acquisition Report (Perrin, 2019).  
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CH-53K Program of Record  
Year Date Event 
2003 September Completed AoA and initiated the Heavy Lift Replacement Program 
2004 December JROC approved CDD 
2005 
October MS B Defense Acquisition Board complete 
December USD(AT&L) approves entrance into MS B under $4.4B HLR program SDD contract 
2010 
January 
Initial Design Review complete; preparations made for CDR 
USMC requests procurement quantity increased from 156 to 
200 aircraft 
April 
Initial flight delayed 2 years (2013) and IOC delayed 3 years 
(FY2018) because of overly aggressive initial program 
schedule 
July CDR complete 
2011 
June USD(R&E) approves post-CDR assessment and program enters Systems Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration 
August Re-baseline: Schedule delayed for EDM, initial flight (2014), and IOC (2019) 
2012 February USMC retires CH-53D 
2013 April Re-baseline: request for increase to 200 aircraft approved 
2015 October First flight test complete 
2016 October IOT&E complete 
2017 April Defense Acquisition Board approves MS C; LRIP begins 
2019 
January 
APB schedule breached and program deviation reported for 
TECHEVAL, IOT&E (OPEVAL), IOC and FRP Decision 
Review from poor testing performance and correction of 
deficiencies  
February Schedule delayed for IOC (2021) and OT&E (2021) because of design deficiencies, specifically engine gas re-ingestion issue 
November Updated APB approved  
2020 January Engine gas Re-ingestion issue resolved 
2021 IOC 
2023-2024 Deployment 
Figure 13. Abbreviated CH-53K Timeline of Significant Events. Source: 
Perrin (2019); Defense Industry Daily Staff (2020). 
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Figure 14. Calendar View of CH-53K Program Major Events. Source: Perrin 
(2019). 
In any defense acquisition program, the warfighter only cares about performance. 
However, the PM’s responsibility is to manage the performance the warfighter wants with 
cost and schedule objectives set by budget constraints. Although Cruise had not been the 
only PM leading this program throughout its acquisition cycle, it was his responsibility to 
analyze what could be improved for future defense acquisition programs. He looked around 
the conference table and asked his test director, Arthur Grey, what his thoughts were about 
the performance of the CH-53K. Grey had been working in the CH-53K program much 
longer than Cruise had and he was well respected amongst his peers. Grey’s perspective 
always provided Cruise with valuable insight and Cruise was curious on what Grey would 
have to say now.  
B. PERFORMANCE 
Grey responded, “From the beginning, the goal for the CH-53K was to exceed the 
CH-53E’s performance in lift and range capabilities (Perrin, 2018). This is no easy task, 
especially when considering immature technologies for the design.” He grabbed a 
whiteboard marker and quickly wrote the main performance requirements on the board. 
The CH-53K can lift 27,000 lb for 110nm in high/hot environments and up to 
36,000 lb, or three times the load of its predecessor, over shorter distances (U.S. Navy, 
2019). Externally, the CH-53K’s cargo hook can lift two HMMWVs, JLTVs, or a LAV 
while still carrying supplies or personnel internally (Marines, n.d.). The cargo hook can 
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also be arranged to deliver three independent supply loads without reconfiguration 
(Marines, n.d.). The cabin is 12 in wider than the CH-53E allowing for larger supply pallets 
or an HMMWV transported internally (U.S. Navy, n.d.). Despite the larger cabin size, the 
CH-53K still has the same shipboard footprint as the CH-53E with lower operating costs 
per aircraft and fewer maintenance man hours per flight hour (U.S. Navy, 2019).  
Compared to its predecessor, the CH-53K aimed for improvements in 
commonality, reliability, maintainability, interoperability, ship integration, survivability, 
and force protection (Perrin, 2018). For example, the CH-53K’s engines provide 57% 
greater horsepower with 63% fewer parts, improving lift capacity and maintainability (U.S. 
Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). The aircraft’s modern glass cockpit, fly-by-wire flight 
controls, and main rotor blades are all improvements found in the CH-53K that brings the 
airframe into the 21st century (U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019). With the CH-53K, the 
USMC will be able to continue conducting missions in heavy-lift operations, support for 
refueling points, assault support, casualty evacuation, and recovery of downed equipment 
(Behler, 2019). 
To achieve these program requirements, the CH-53K program followed the 
traditional major capabilities acquisition pathway within the adaptive acquisition 
framework and underwent numerous rounds of design planning, testing, and modifications 
to develop an aircraft that could meet the warfighter’s needs. Figure 15 details the CH-
53K’s key performance parameters and how they have tracked throughout the program’s 
updates (Perrin, 2019). Grey pulled this figure from his notes and taped it to the board next 
to his bulleted capabilities list for everyone to see.  
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Figure 15. CH-53K Performance Characteristics. Source: Perrin (2019).
Type Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold
Net Ready (NR)
KPP Satisfy 100% of NR 
Reqts in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
reqts designated as 
enterprise-level or 
critical in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
Reqts in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
reqts designated as 
enterprise-level or 
critical in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
Reqts in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
reqts designated as 
enterprise-level or 
critical in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
Reqts in JIA
Satisfy 100% of NR 
reqts designated as 
enterprise-level or 
critical in JIA
KPP 110 w/30,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/27,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/30,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/27,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/30,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/27,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/30,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
110 w/27,000 lbs 
external load, no 
refuel
KPP 90% 89% 90% 89% 90% 89% 90% 89%
KPP 10% reduction from 
current CH-53E
<= current CH-53E 10% reduction from 
current CH-53E
<= current CH-53E 10% reduction from 
current CH-53E
<= current CH-53E 10% reduction from 
current CH-53E
<= current CH-53E
KPP 2.6 sorties/2.25 hrs 2.6 sorties/2.25 hrs (T=O) 2.6 
sorties/2.25 hrs
2.6 sorties/2.25 hrs (T=O) 2.6 
sorties/2.25 hrs
2.6 sorties/2.25 hrs (T=O) 2.6 
sorties/2.25 hrs
2.6 sorties/2.25 hrs
* Denotes change in Objective/Threshold from prior APB
Performance Characteristics
Range & Payload (NM)
Mission Reliability















Cruise interrupted, “Wait, are you telling me that for almost 15 years, this 
program’s performance characteristics were never modified or reduced?” Grey responded, 
“Not exactly. We made performance a priority in this program because the warfighter 
deserves the best capability we can provide. Unfortunately, achieving these capabilities 
was more challenging than we anticipated, especially in maturing some of the critical 
technologies. We ultimately maintained performance of the KPPs in the baseline but 
abandoned several of the most immature critical technologies in the early stages and only 
focused on two, but even these caused significant delays in the program. We also added a 
cybersecurity requirement to the system in 2017, over 10 years since the program began.”  
The CH-53K program identified three critical technologies, none of which were 
fully mature when the program entered development in 2005. Early GAO reports showed 
the CH-53K with up to 10 critical technologies, but most were recategorized as noncritical 
or were integrated from other programs (GAO, 2007). The three remaining critical 
technologies were the main rotor blade, the main gearbox, and the main rotor viscoelastic 
lag damper, which prevents excessive blade lagging (GAO, 2007). The program office 
expected the viscoelastic lag damper to achieve maturity in 2009 but decided to abandon 
the technology altogether and replace it with a modified version of an existing and fully 
mature design (GAO, 2007, 2009). Instead, the CH-53K would have a linear hydraulic 
damper, which has only half the reliability of the originally proposed viscoelastic damper 
but twice the reliability of the current CH-53E damper (GAO, 2009). Despite the reduction 
in reliability of the linear hydraulic damper, this change still supported the 89% reliability 
KPP shown in Figure 15. Figure 16 tracks the technology readiness levels of these three 
critical technologies throughout the program. 
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Technology Readiness Levels 









Est @ Next 
Milestone 




TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 6 N/A 
Main Rotor Gearbox TRL 4 TRL 7 TRL 4 TRL 7 
Figure 16. Technology Readiness Levels for the CH-53K’s Three Critical 
Technologies. Source: DAMIR PowerPoint Slides (March 5, 2007; March 
5, 2008). 
The remaining two critical technologies, the main rotor blade and the main gearbox, 
were expected to achieve full maturity by 2012 (GAO, 2007). After several delays due to 
design changes, both technologies achieved maturity in FY2018, nearly 6 years behind 
schedule (GAO, 2018). These two technologies accounted for many of the delays in the 
program and required schedule adaptations that were not consistent with best practices 
(GAO, 2016).  
The main rotor blade was designated a critical technology because one of the CH-
53K’s requirements was for the aircraft to have the same shipboard logistical footprint as 
the CH-53E, but with better performance. However, with a heavier gross weight and load 
capacity, the CH-53K rotor blades required more vertical lift than the CH-53E. The 71% 
increase in power from the CH-53K’s new engines helped achieve that additional vertical 
lift, but the rotor blades must also be designed to handle the increased power (Defense 
Industry Daily Staff, 2020). Initial designs started with a main rotor blade that was 6% 
longer than its predecessor, but that would increase the aircraft’s logistical shipboard 
footprint (GAO, 2007). Eventually, designs settled on the same length main rotor blade 
with a 11% increase in width, creating 12% more surface area for the desired vertical lift 
ability (GAO, 2008; Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020). The new designs on the main 
rotor blade tips improve hover performance and are easier to maintain (Defense Industry 
Daily Staff, 2020). The CH-53K’s tail rotor blades were also modified for 15% greater 
surface area to increase thrust and balance with the more powerful main rotor (Defense 
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Industry Daily Staff, 2020). Small scale models of the main rotor blades were tested with 
exceptional results in 2009, but the full model could not be tested and considered fully 
mature until test aircraft were built due to a lack of wind tunnels large enough for the 79-
ft (24-m) diameter (GAO, 2009). Further testing was conducted once the rotors were 
installed on the ground test vehicle (GTV; Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020). 
The main gearbox has always posed challenges in the design, development, and 
maintenance of rotary aircraft. Although other aircraft have used a similar and 
technologically mature main gearbox design for years, their expected load capacity is 
significantly less than the CH-53K requirement (GAO, 2008). In 2008, the main gearbox 
had achieved greater than 100% of its torque requirement but was not considered fully 
mature until 10 years later, when it was tested and modified to operate in a realistic 
environment (GAO, 2008, 2018). Main gearbox repairs are typically a depot-level repair 
because they are difficult and many of the spare parts are not stored onboard ships (Naval 
Air Systems Command, 2020). The increased reliability in the CH-53K main gearbox 
compared to the CH-53E will reduce maintenance costs and aircraft downtime. However, 
achieving that increased reliability comes with a significant cost associated with the 
unexpected additional testing required to solve its design deficiencies (Snow, 2019).  
As Grey finished describing the testing challenges behind the program’s critical 
technologies, Cruise asked for his professional opinion. “I understand these critical 
technologies were harder to achieve than we anticipated, but were the cost and schedule 
delays worth it?” Grey paused to consider and then replied, “Yes, I believe so. Both the 
warfighter and the taxpayer deserve results from this system. Without the additional 
financial investments and schedule deviations, we would not have been able to produce as 
system worth fielding for the next several decades.” Cruise noted Grey’s thoughts and 
changed the topic to more recent events. “What about the 126 technical deficiencies 
reported when I first arrived? Why were there so many deficiencies discovered so late in 
the testing process?”  
The December 2018 SAR stated that the CH-53K was tracking 126 technical 
deficiencies required to achieve a deployable configuration (Perrin, 2018). The largest 
concern from these deficiencies is a common problem for triple engine rotary aircraft called 
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engine gas re-ingestion, which is when hot gases from engine exhaust are re-ingested 
through the engine during flight (Eckstein, 2019b). Negative effects from engine gas re-
ingestion include poor engine performance, degradation, overheating, and increased engine 
stalls, which can significantly impact life-cycle costs (Eckstein, 2019b). Sikorsky 
dedicated one test aircraft strictly to resolving this engine gas re-ingestion issue, while the 
other five test aircraft divided up the remaining 125 deficiencies (Eckstein, 2019b). 
Engineers suspected that the left engine exhaust was the culprit, but a test using colored oil 
smoke, shown in Figure 17, identified two engines whose exhaust would get caught 
underneath the dead space of the rotor where an engine intake was located (Eckstein, 
2019b). 
  
Figure 17. Colored Oil Smoke Test Identifies Cause of Engine Gas Re-
ingestion Issue. Source: Eckstein (2019b). 
In December 2019, a longer exhaust pipe with additional support was installed, and 
the program was officially back on track for IOT&E in 2021 and first deployment in 2023 
or 2024 (Behler, 2019; Eckstein, 2019b). With the program’s largest concern resolved, the 
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DOT&E recommended that the program complete the system development and 
demonstration (SDD) and LFT&E phases and develop a sustainable schedule for Follow-
on Operational Testing and Evaluation (Behler, 2019). As for the other 125 deficiencies, 
Grey assured Cruise that they were minor deficiencies and that his team will have solutions 
for 106 of them before IOT&E begins (Behler, 2019).  
“One last comment to add,” Grey said, “Cybersecurity concerns were a huge 
challenge for my team. When the program was initiated in 2005, there were no 
cybersecurity requirements detailed in the program’s documentation (GAO, 2020). These 
requirements were added in 2017 when the program was already very late in its 
development cycle (GAO, 2020). To address these late requirements, we modernized 
aircraft survivability equipment to better protect the data the aircraft has gathered and 
designed hardware to be easily upgradeable over the aircraft’s life cycle; however, it was 
a very difficult task to achieve when the aircraft’s design was already solidified (Behler, 
2018). The GAO (2020) commented that late integration of cybersecurity requirements has 
often led to design challenges and increased program costs compared to including these 
requirements from the beginning. I agree, however, rapidly emerging cyber threats paired 
with lengthy contractual lead times add the risk of solutions becoming obsolete before they 
are even applied (GAO, 2018).” Cruise jotted a few notes down from Grey’s last statement 
and addressed another well-esteemed individual in the room, his financial manager, Robin 
Burke. She had been with the CH-53K program for a few years longer than Cruise and 
through most of the program’s financial setbacks. Cruise always appreciated her ability to 
speak the truth, even when it usually meant the program was in trouble.  
C. COST AND SCHEDULE SETBACKS 
“This program experienced many cost and schedule setbacks; however, not all of 
them were a result of poor performance testing as Mr. Grey just outlined. Many of these 
changes can be attributed to the program’s procurement quantity increases, late component 
deliveries, and facility changes,” Burke started. She taped a small schedule of events to the 
whiteboard next to Mr. Grey’s performance characteristics (see Figure 18). “This shows a 
comparison of the schedule changes from the original 2005 baseline to the current 2019 
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estimates (Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval [DAMIR], 2019). 
What we see from this is a 6-year delay for IOC and a 7-year delay for the FRP decision, 




APB (Development)  
12/22/2005  
Objective/Threshold 
APB Change 1 (Production)  
11/26/2019  
Objective/Threshold 
Milestone B DAB 
Review Oct 2005 Apr 2006 Dec 2005 Dec 2005 
CDR Mar 2009 Sep 2009 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 
Milestone C Dec 2012 Jun 2013 Apr 2017 Apr 2017 
TECHEVAL Complete Oct 2014 Apr 2015 Dec 2020 Jun 2021 
IOC Sep 2015 Mar 2016 Sep 2021 June 2022 
IOT&E (OPEVAL) 
Complete Jun 2015 Dec 2015 Dec 2021 Jun 2022 
FRP Decision Review Dec 2015 Jun 2016 Nov 2022 May 2023 
MDA Design Readiness 
Review Apr 2009 Oct 2009 Deleted Deleted 
Figure 18. CH-53K Acquisition Program Baselines for Schedule. Source: 
DAMIR (2019). 
Design challenges with the program’s critical technologies (i.e., main rotor blades 
and main gearbox) and non-critical technologies led to early delays that repeatedly 
postponed the program’s critical design review (CDR; GAO, 2010). The program office, 
in accordance with best practices, refused to enter the CDR until all subsystem design 
reviews were completed; however, this led to a delay of over a year to complete the CDR 
(GAO, 2010). To attempt to get the program back on schedule, the program office opted 
to eliminate noncritical tasks and defer three net-ready capabilities to production to save 
$103.5 million in development costs (GAO, 2010, 2011a). Deferring these capabilities—
in this case, the variable message format, mode 5, and link 16, which are various systems 
for audio or visual military communication and threat identification—would be a trade-off 
to the warfighter because the initial aircraft will not have these capabilities until updates 
can be installed when the program reaches full production (GAO, 2011a). 
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The GTV began assembly in June 2011 and was delivered on time to Sikorsky in 
December 2012 (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020). However, design complications, late 
component deliveries, and part shortages for the GTV’s testing stand contributed to another 
1-year delay for the GTV’s initial testing (GAO, 2015).  
Best practices demand that at least 90% of the design drawings are released to 
developmental manufacturing prior to the CDR to determine the program’s design stability 
(GAO, 2018). In 2010, 11,756 out of 17,622, or approximately 67%, of the expected 
drawings had been released, with the goal of achieving 90% prior to the program’s design 
review in March 2011 (GAO, 2010). The GAO (2011a) reported the following year that 
this goal was achieved, and the design was officially considered stable as it entered the 
CDR. However, despite the repeated delays, it was determined at the CDR that the design 
was still unstable, to an unknown extent, and that they had only achieved a level of 89% 
released drawings, just short of best practice standards (GAO, 2018). The program did not 
collect traditional information about design stability for the GAO to track in its early stages, 
and it ceased collecting the stability data altogether after it falsely achieved its goal of 90% 
released design drawings, resulting in its unknown instability assessment at the program’s 
CDR (GAO, 2009, 2017). The unexpected number of design changes required after the 
CDR, especially to noncritical technologies, caused further delays in testing and production 
as designs continued to be modified (GAO, 2017). However, the program deemed that 
these modifications would still allow the CH-53K to exceed all of its KPP (GAO, 2017).  
Burke continued, “The largest program cost growth we experienced is when the 
USMC decided to increase their CH-53K procurement quantity from 156 to 200 aircraft in 
2013. With nearly a 30% increase in quantity, we could expect a significant cost growth; 
however, these increases were questioned by the IG” (see Figure 19 and Figure 20).  
Figure 19 depicts how costs were allocated and expended over the course of the program 
in comparison to the quantity received. Since the USMC allocated more funds to 
compensate for their quantity increase, these changes did not cause expenditures to exceed 
the allocations (see Figure 19) despite the sharp increase in costs shown in change 1 of the 
development APB (see Figure 20). “Although the USMC planned and programmed for the 
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additional aircraft and we re-baselined our numbers, the IG still considered these increases 
as unjustified,” Burke noted.  
 




Figure 20. CH-53K Acquisition Program Baseline for Cost. Source: DAMIR 
(2019).  
Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold
RDT&E 4366.4 N/A 6273.7 N/A 6957.8 N/A 8048.2 N/A
Procurement 14399.9 N/A 22178.8 N/A 24263.3 N/A 25812.5 N/A
MILCON 0 N/A 48.1 N/A 13.2 N/A 13.3 N/A
Acq O&M 0 N/A 0.0 N/A 0.0 N/A 0.0 N/A
Total Acquisition Cost 18766.3 N/A 28500.6 N/A 31234.3 N/A 33874.0 N/A
O&S 52062.7 N/A 78156.7 N/A 77882.8 N/A 81015.6 N/A
Total Life-Cycle Cost 70829 N/A 106657 N/A 109117 N/A 114890 N/A
Prog Acq Unit Cost ($M) 120.297 N/A 142.503 N/A 156.172 N/A 169.37 N/A
Avg Proc Unit Cost ($M) 94.736 N/A 113.157 N/A 125.069 N/A 131.696 N/A
Base-Year $M (BY2006)
RDT&E 3962.0 4358.2 5535.9 6089.5 6018.2 6620.1 N/A N/A
Procurement 11018.9 12120.8 16118.3 17730.0 16921.9 18614.1 N/A N/A
MILCON 0.0 N/A 39.6 43.6 11.0 12.1 N/A N/A
Acq O&M 0.0 N/A 0.0 N/A 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A
Total Acquisition Cost 14980.9 N/A 21693.8 N/A 22951.1 N/A N/A N/A
O&S 23519.2 25871.1 37520.3 41272.3 38209.8 42030.8 N/A N/A
Total Life-Cycle Cost 38500.1 N/A 59214.1 N/A 61160.9 N/A N/A N/A
Prog Acq Unit Cost ($M) 96.031 105.635 108.489 119.315 114.756 126.231 N/A N/A
Avg Proc Unit Cost ($M) 72.493 79.742 82.236 90.46 87.226 95.949 N/A N/A
Base-Year $M (BY2017)
RDT&E N/A N/A N/A N/A 7265.0 7991.5 8233.3 9056.9
Procurement N/A N/A N/A N/A 20427.5 22470.3 21295.7 23425.3
MILCON N/A N/A N/A N/A 13.3 14.6 13.3 14.6
Acq O&M N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Total Acquisition Cost N/A N/A N/A N/A 27705.8 N/A 29542.3 N/A
O&S N/A N/A N/A N/A 46188.9 50807.8 46261.2 50887.3
Total Life-Cycle Cost N/A N/A N/A N/A 73894.7 N/A 75803.5 N/A
Prog Acq Unit Cost ($M) N/A N/A N/A N/A 138.529 152.382 147.712 162.483
Avg Proc Unit Cost ($M) N/A N/A N/A N/A 105.296 115.826 108.652 119.517
Quantity
RDT&E 4 N/A 4 N/A 6 N/A 4 N/A
















In May 2013, the IG calculated that the additional 44 aircraft resulted in an 
additional $22.2 billion in procurement and O&S costs (IG, 2013a). Another IG report 
compared the costs listed in the CH-53K APB from its initial procurement of 156 aircraft 
in 2005 to its increased 200-aircraft procurement, as shown in Figure 21 (IG, 2013b). The 
increase in RDT&E costs is attributed to the technical setbacks and schedule delays 
mentioned previously; procurement costs increased significantly because of the additional 
44 aircraft, and O&S cost increases were a result of the additional aircraft, extended support 
duration, and a change in cost-estimation methodologies (IG, 2013b). After accounting for 
inflation, the GAO calculated that the CH-53K’s total program costs increased 42.5% from 
2005 to 2013, which was due largely to the increased procurement quantity (GAO, 2014).  
   
Figure 21. Comparison of 2005 and 2013 CH-53K APB Costs. Source: IG 
(2013b). 
 The IG also reported on the schedule delays that appeared in the program’s updated 
APB. These delays are attributed to the technical setbacks stated previously as well as 
contracting delays and contractor staffing difficulties (IG, 2013b). Figure 22 outlines the 
schedule changes made from 2005 to 2013.  
57 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of 2005 and 2013 APB Milestones. Source: IG 
(2013b). 
“The GAO also reported on the program’s cost and schedule setbacks and most 
attributed them to our technical complications,” Burke added. “One report noted our 
change in acquisition cycle time from 119 months to 147 months from 2005 to 2013 (GAO, 
2014). They also calculated that prior to the program’s production readiness review in 
preparation for a MS C decision, the program had already experienced a 31.9% increase in 
schedule time (GAO, 2014).”  
 The program’s first flight test was originally scheduled for FY2013, but the 
program did not begin assembly of the first EDM test aircraft until early 2012 (Defense 
Industry Daily Staff, 2020). Qualification testing failures with this first EDM model 
delayed the program’s first flight test and created complications for the other three EDM 
models being assembled for future testing activities (GAO, 2015). Nearly 3 years behind 
schedule, the CH-53K accomplished its first flight test in October 2015 (GAO, 2016). IOC 
was delayed to late 2019 because of the late first flight; however, further complications 
with the main gearbox during flight testing delayed IOC until 2021, with deployment 
planned for 2023 or 2024 (Leone, 2019).  
As the testing delays continued to compound on each other, the LRIP decision was 
postponed to March 2017, exceeding the program’s delay parameters, which required the 
USMC to report to the USD(AT&L) (GAO, 2017). Typically, this scenario requires an 
immediate program re-baseline, but the USD(AT&L) decided not to require the re-baseline 
until after it achieved its LRIP decision (GAO, 2017). This allowed the program to 
demonstrate control of their manufacturing processes before production began, which 
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helped provide a more accurate re-baseline of future costs and schedule goals (GAO, 2017). 
After successful test performances from the program’s operational assessment (OA) in 
September 2016, the DOT&E supported the CH-53K’s entry into production with the 
requirement that the engine design be modified to prevent overheating in certain conditions 
(GAO, 2018). The contract stated that each aircraft will cost on average $105 million with 
spare parts and services included (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020).  
The CH-53K program was also delayed by a change in production facilities when 
Sikorsky was acquired by Lockheed Martin in 2015 (GAO, 2017). The CH-53K production 
line was moved from a United Technologies facility in Palm Beach, FL, to Sikorsky’s 
headquarters in Stratford, CT (GAO, 2017).  
The most recent analysis of cost and schedule changes was published by the GAO 
in June 2020 during their annual assessment for defense weapon systems (GAO, 2020). 
Figure 23 compares the CH-53K program’s original 2005 estimates for 156 aircraft to the 
2019 estimates and expenditures for 200 aircraft in FY2020 dollars (GAO, 2020). Since 
the program’s initiation in 2005, unit costs and schedule (in months) have climbed 28.4% 
and 61.5%, respectively (GAO, 2020). The GAO reported the CH-53K at $157.6 million 
FY2020 dollars, which some sources have compared to the USMC variant of the Joint 
Strike Fighter, the F-35B, at $101.3 million for Lot 14 (GAO, 2020; Mizokami, 2017; 
Insinna, 2019).  
 
Figure 23. Cost and Schedule Change Comparison. Source: GAO (2020).  
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“Overall, I would say several factors contributed to the numerous cost increases 
and schedule delays incurred within the CH-53K program. Poor performance in testing 
events, unstable designs, and increased procurement quantities led to most of these 
setbacks. Additional obstacles included late component deliveries, and contractor 
difficulties with employee staffing, a relocation in production line facilities. However, I 
consider many of these factors out of our control as the program office,” said Burke. Cruise 
noted Burke’s opinion and asked “What about foreign sales? How have those affected the 
program?” Burke sighed, “We took a hit in foreign military sales.” 
D. FOREIGN SALES 
In the early 1970s, Israel acquired the CH-53D and Germany the CH-53G, which 
have both undergone “Reset” programs similar to the USMC’s CH-53E’s (see the 
Operational Availability section for more information on the CH-53E Reset initiative) and 
are expected to complete their service life in the 2030s leaving both militaries in need of a 
new heavy-lift aircraft (Freedberg & Egozi, 2019; Lockheed Martin, n.d.). 
“Competition has been tough in both Israel and Germany. Israel was debating 
between the CH-53K, Boeing’s CH-47F, and Bell-Boeing’s V-22 until budget constraints 
and the high priority of the F-35 halted all progress towards acquiring the V-22 in 2012 
(Egozi, 2020). Until recently, we were only competing against the CH-47F Block II for 
Israel’s 20-aircraft procurement and Germany’s 44–60 aircraft procurement (Reim, 2020; 
Sprenger, 2020),” Burke stated. 
From the Israeli government’s perspective, the CH-53K is not only competing with 
the CH-47F for the Israeli contract, but also for a spot in their country’s budget as they 
wish to procure additional ships and submarines from Germany to satisfy their increasing 
demands for missile defense capabilities (Egozi, 2020). The Israeli Air Force submitted a 
letter of request for pricing and availability of the CH-53K in January 2017 (Perrin, 2018). 
Since then, an Israeli test team of three pilots, a mechanic, and a program manager have 
been stationed at Patuxent Naval Air Station to test the new developmental and LRIP CH-
53K aircraft to determine feasibility for their operational requirements (Freedberg & Egozi, 
2019). Although the CH-53K would be a monumental upgrade for the Israeli Air Force 
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compared to the current CH-53Ds, it comes at the cost of acquiring an entirely new aircraft 
since the two models do not share any similar parts (Freedberg & Egozi, 2019). Training, 
maintenance, and sustainment costs are all significant factors as they move forward in the 
selection process for their 20-aircraft procurement (Freedberg & Egozi, 2019). 
To fulfill their heavy-lift requirements, Germany’s Luftwaffe anticipated procuring 
their selected aircraft over an 8-year period with deliveries beginning in 2023 (Mader, 
2019). Considering all the CH-53K delays, this was a tight timeline for the CH-53K to 
achieve and made the upgraded CH-47F an appealing option for the Luftwaffe (Mader, 
2019). Although Sikorsky relied on their past success with the CH-53G and a strong 
German industrial base to seal the deal for this contract, Boeing also has 10 German 
companies on their side for the CH-47F (Lockheed Martin, n.d; Mader, 2019).  
Burke said, “We anticipated the selection announcement from the Luftwaffe in 
2021; however, a recent and surprise decision by the German Defence Ministry announced 
that Germany decided to walk away from both our program and the CH-47F, stating that 
selecting either aircraft would be uneconomical (Sprenger, 2020). Despite German 
officials’ goals to keep defense spending high, this decision is likely a result of the 
unanticipated impacts of the COVID-19 virus (Sprenger, 2020). Therefore, we can no 
longer rely on Germany’s contract to reduce our production costs.” 
Cruise nodded his head and looked towards his warfighter representative, Major 
Michael Matthews. As a seasoned USMC CH-53E pilot with several deployments to Iraq 
and Afghanistan, no one knows better than Matthews about what warfighters need and how 
fast they need it. Cruise asked, “Major Matthews, anything to add from your perspective?”  
E. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY  
“Sir, if I may be frank, our Marines needed these aircraft 6 years ago when this 
program first promised to deliver these aircraft. The delays in this program have caused 
disastrous effects to the current CH-53E platform which led to huge increases in 
operational costs for dwindling operational availability rates. Marines can’t complete their 
missions when their aircraft are constantly down for maintenance and unless the CH-53K 
gets to them soon, they won’t have much to work with,” Matthews explained. 
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The current CH-53E aircraft are operating at three times the planned utilization rate, 
resulting in a faster attrition rate than expected and an increased need for the CH-53K 
(GAO, 2007). These attrition effects were partly due to pushing the airframe beyond its 
thresholds, which is why the CH-53K is designed with improved performance for heat, 
distance, and load capacity (GAO, 2008). To combat the rapid attrition of the current CH-
53Es, the USMC initiated the CH-53E Reset program, which repairs aircraft back to the 
original off-the-production-line setting in order to reduce maintenance time and extend the 
service life of the aircraft to 2031 (Eckstein, 2019a). The numerous delays in the CH-53K 
program forced the USMC to consider the eligibility of the CH-53D aircraft for the Reset 
program as well, but they ultimately decided to retire the CH-53D in 2012 to reduce costs 
(GAO, 2011a; Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2020). This decision left the USMC in dire 
need of new heavy-lift helicopters.  
 In 2008, the USMC increased the procurement quantity for the CH-53K from 156 
to 200 aircraft in accordance with their plan to expand personnel numbers from 174,000 to 
202,000 Marines (GAO, 2011a). In March 2011, the USMC completed another force 
structure review that dictated they would reduce personnel numbers by 20,000 Marines in 
2015; however, the USMC determined the 200 aircraft procurement was still justified 
despite an adverse IG report published in 2013 (see Chapter III; GAO, 2013). Despite the 
validated increase to 200 aircraft, the USMC is still short 20 aircraft as required by the 
program’s CPD to fulfill operational effectiveness under standard maintenance cycles 
(DOD, 2018). This deficit will likely cause operational readiness challenges similar to 
those incurred by the CH-53E (DOD, 2018). 
 “I hope the CH-53K lives up to the reduced maintenance cycles and better 
reliability this program promised. Unless we procure more aircraft, I foresee being in this 
exact position 20 years from now,” Matthews concluded.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Cruise thanked his staff for their time and walked back to his office deep in thought. 
With the program still not at IOC yet, Cruise sat with his head spinning given all the 
contributing factors that led to the CH-53K’s current predicament. Senior leaders wanted 
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to know why this program continuously failed to keep its baselines and recommendations 
to prevent the same mistakes happening again in future programs. What was he going to 
tell them?  
Discussion Questions:  
i) From the warfighter’s perspective, why is the CH-53K important? 
ii) Why did the program not meet its baseline? 
iii) What setbacks in this program could have been avoided? How? 
iv) How do media portrayals of the program affect the program? 
v) How do foreign sales impact program decisions? 
vi) What are the lessons learned from the CH-53K program that could be 
applied to future defense acquisition programs?   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The CH-53K is not only a substantial technological upgrade to the USMC’s heavy-
lift aircraft inventory, but also a remarkable engineering feat that enhances the warfighter’s 
ability to fulfill operational requirements. Designing an aircraft with three times the lift 
capacity within the same dimensions as its predecessor pushes the boundaries of 
technological maturity and requires innovation and creativity to make it a reality. That 
being said, the performance setbacks experienced in this program, although costly, are 
normal and should be expected when squeezing every ounce of capability out of an 
airframe. Despite program setbacks and negative media attention, cost growth and schedule 
delays from technical challenges are common in defense acquisition programs. Key 
takeaways from this CH-53K case history are as follows:  
∑ The defense acquisition process, along with its various interworking 
components and how they balance cost, schedule, and performance within 
a program, must be fully understood. 
∑ Cost growth and schedule delays from performance setbacks should be 
anticipated for complex systems.  
∑ Cost growth from increased procurement quantity does not indicate a 
program setback.  
∑ Procuring a sufficient number of systems prevents significant life-cycle 
cost growth. 
∑ Well-defined requirements are essential to meet warfighter needs and 
maintain program baselines.  
Although these lessons are simply stated, they can be difficult to achieve in practice 
and their solutions go beyond the scope of this research. Although these lessons are simply 
stated, they can be difficult to achieve in practice, and their solutions go beyond the scope 
of this research. Further areas of research include investigating improvements for balancing 
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the event-driven acquisition process with schedule-driven appropriation funding and 
examining cost estimation methodologies to account for predictable performance setbacks. 
The aim of this case history was to provide acquisition students with a real scenario 
of how the defense acquisition system works in practice. This particular case, although 
unique in its own way, is similar to many MDAPs in the sense that it uses a complex 
process with numerous interconnected considerations and stakeholders that can complicate 
finding solutions to problems that arise within the program. The following sections offer 
conclusions regarding the acquisition of the CH-53K and the discussion questions posed at 
the end of the case history. They can be used to stimulate discussion among acquisition 
students about this case.  
A. PERFORMANCE, COST, AND SCHEDULE 
The role of the PM is to manage the “triple constraint,” i.e., the cost, schedule, and 
performance of a defense acquisition program. Although the acquisition system is 
constrained by budgetary resources, performance is often the most important factor in the 
triple constraint and the PM will do what he/she can to achieve the performance criteria. 
This often requires letting cost and schedule goals slip, especially when technology is 
immature. The CH-53K case demonstrated this when poor performance during testing 
resulted in cost increases and schedule delays to correct the deficiencies found in testing. 
When dealing with immature technologies or complex systems, some level of test failure 
and rework should be expected to develop the system according to its specifications.   
The CH-53K program encountered an issue with proper tracking of their released 
design drawings affecting the stability of the aircraft’s design. Although it seems like a 
minor shortfall that the program only released 89% of their design drawings at CDR when 
best practices dictate 90%, the impact this shortfall had was significant on cost and 
schedule goals. The purpose of the CDR is to ensure a stable design before entering the 
production phase. Producing an unstable design, even in LRIP quantities, can still have a 
significant impact on cost and schedule when reworks are required to correct the design. 
Ensuring a stable design prior to MS C is essential to mitigating future cost and schedule 
setbacks.  
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CH-53K program documentation indicated that cost and schedule baselines 
changed several times throughout its development and production phases, but performance 
baselines remained the same (see Figure 15). However, the program deferred three net-
ready capabilities – Link-16, variable message format, and Mode V – from IOC to FOC 
and relaxed the maintenance time requirement for mean time to repair and mean corrective 
maintenance time. Even though the maintenance time requirement was relaxed to maintain 
the logistics footprint KPP and the three net-ready capabilities were only deferred and not 
deleted, both the net-ready and reliability KPP baselines were changed, despite what top-
level program documentation indicates. Further research is required to determine if, and to 
what extent, these lower-level changes affected the top-level performance baselines.  
The comparison of the CH-53K to the F-35 in terms of unit costs was also another 
detriment to the CH-53K program, particularly because of how the data was presented. 
Despite these comparisons being numerically accurate, it is important to note that they are 
comparing the aircraft at different stages in their production lines. It is true that the CH-
53K currently costs more than the Joint Strike Fighter, but the F-35 has had the added 
benefit of reducing unit costs through improved manufacturing processes. In other words, 
comparing the first few CH-53K aircraft, which will undoubtedly be the most expensive, 
to F-35B Lot 14 aircraft is a skewed perception. As greater quantities of any system are 
produced, unit costs will decrease as the manufacturing process becomes smoother and the 
production line exploits the benefits of economies of scale. When the F-35 was in its LRIP 
phase, unit costs for the U.S. Air Force’s less-expensive variant were approximately $221.2 
million in 2007, which is significantly more than the CH-53K’s LRIP unit cost. (McCarthy, 
2018). Attempts such as this to skew the data of a particular program can have negative 
effects on public opinion towards that system. A better method to analyze cost comparisons 
is to measure the percent change within the CH-53K program itself.  
B. QUANTITY 
Quantity procured can certainly affect program costs; however, increasing quantity 
does not mean the program has experienced a setback resulting from the failure to achieve 
its cost goals. As was done with the CH-53K program, any program that modifies their 
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procurement quantity will need to re-baseline the program to the new quantity, so that 
percentage change comparisons can be tracked appropriately. However, the USMC 
justification for the quantity increase based on force structure reviews, personnel numbers, 
and end strength was inadequate in accordance with common practices and resulted in an 
adverse IG report. Instead of using constantly fluctuating personnel and end strength 
numbers, it would have been more appropriate to use the Ao calculation as justification for 
their quantity increase.    
A squadron’s operational availability (Ao) is measured by the number of fully 
mission capable aircraft they have at any given time (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations [CNO], 2003). Ao can be calculated in either of two methods: total uptime 
divided by the total uptime plus downtime or the number of systems that are ready divided 
by the total number of systems owned (CNO, 2003). A squadron’s Ao varies throughout 
the year depending on maintenance cycles, deployment schedules, and aircraft type, so the 
following simplified example uses a fictitious Ao to illustrate the dilemma the CH-53K is 
likely to experience if the USMC does not acquire the additional 20 aircraft as required by 
the CPD to obtain full operational effectiveness (DOD, 2018).  
If the USMC determines that they need 154 fully mission capable CH-53K aircraft 
at any given time with an Ao of 70% to fulfill their operational requirements, the program 
office can calculate with the Ao equation that the USMC needs 220 aircraft to sustain 
normal maintenance and repair cycles (CNO, 2003). However, when the USMC only 
procures 200 aircraft and operates at the same level, they achieve an initial Ao of 77% 
(CNO, 2003). When those initial aircraft need depot maintenance time, some aircraft will 
be forced to remain with the squadrons to work “overtime” so that the squadrons can meet 
their operational goals. This increases the mean time between maintenance (MTBM) and, 
ultimately, the mean down time (MDT) as those overtime aircraft experience longer depot 
times. The longer depot times will translate into a delayed maintenance cycle where 
operational aircraft experience even more increases in MTBM, resulting in an even greater 
MDT. This vicious cycle is exactly what required the CH-53E to undergo the Reset 
program and made the aircraft so expensive in its final years. Decreased aircraft inventory 
only exacerbates this problem and significant cost increases could be prevented with the 
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CH-53K if the program meets the CPD requirement. By failing to meet this CH-53K 
inventory requirement from the start, the USMC is likely to repeat history with a costly 
cycle of increased maintenance time per aircraft. Often, additional aircraft requests appear 
on an unfunded requirements list; however, the USMC has already anticipated another 20 
aircraft in their 30-year plan (Gertler, 2018). 
Foreign sales can benefit a program’s cost goals by spreading the manufacturing 
costs over a greater quantity of systems that are not paid for by the U.S. government. In the 
same way that unit costs decrease as quantities are increased, foreign sales decrease unit 
costs for the U.S. procurement by exploiting economies of scale on the production line 
(Schogol, 2017). Therefore, the facilities’ fixed costs will be spread among more than one 
buyer.  
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Complications on the contractor’s side also added to the program’s challenges. In 
the program’s early stages, Sikorsky struggled with staffing their offices with qualified 
personnel, causing delays in the aircraft’s design development. 
Sikorsky’s ownership change from United Technologies to Lockheed Martin in 
2015 also delayed the CH-53K program (GAO, 2017). The program’s production line was 
moved from a United Technologies facility in Palm Beach, FL, to Sikorsky’s headquarters 
in Stratford, CT which interrupted the flow of production (GAO, 2017). Not only did the 
Stratford facility require additional equipment and configuration changes to accommodate 
the new production line, but this relocation also occurred in the middle of assembly for the 
System Demonstration Test Articles (SDTA) aircraft (GAO, 2018). Sikorsky decided to 
complete the first four SDTA aircraft at the Palm Beach location and then transition to 
Stratford for the final SDTA aircraft (GAO, 2018). This interruption mid-assembly has 
contributed to the many complications in achieving statistical control in critical 
manufacturing processes, which is required for FRP (GAO, 2020). To certify that 
manufacturing processes are repeatable, sustainable, and consistent in producing quality 
aircraft, best practices indicate achieving statistical control of manufacturing processes 
prior to starting production (GAO, 2020).     
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D. DISCUSSION QUESTION ANSWERS 
The answers to the questions below are designed to facilitate conversation among 
students and case readers about the defense acquisition process and the challenges MDAPs 
face when developing a suitable design to the warfighter. There are many stakeholder 
perspectives to consider, which can make defense acquisitions complicated. These answers 
are not all-inclusive but should guide conversation to discuss the considerations involved 
in balancing a program’s cost, schedule, and performance criteria. 
1. From the warfighter’s perspective, why is the CH-53K important? 
The heavy-lift capability for equipment, cargo, and personnel is essential for the 
USMC to conduct force projection and military operations. With the average age of the 
CH-53E at 32.6 years old, increased maintenance costs and aircraft down time have 
impeded the USMC’s ability to conduct those operations (Reim, 2018). Despite efforts 
from the CH-53E Reset program extending aircraft service life to the 2030s, attrition rates 
are still impacting operational availability numbers and increasing the need for a new 
aircraft (Eckstein, 2019a). Also, heavier equipment, such as the HMMWV, JLTV, and 
LAV have necessitated and increased lift capacity (GAO, 2011b; Marines, n.d.). Lifting 
three times the load of the CH-53E, the CH-53K can lift 27,000 lb (12,247 kg) for 110 
nautical miles in high/hot environments and up to 36,000 lb (16,329 kg) in less extreme 
temperatures (U.S. Navy, 2019). Additionally, its modern design should increase reliability 
and decrease maintenance time required to keep the aircraft operational. For example, the 
CH-53K’s engines are built with 63% fewer parts than its predecessor which should 
simplify maintenance procedures (U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 2019).   
2. Why did the program not meet its baseline? 
There are numerous reasons why the CH-53K program did not meet its baseline. 
As with any MDAPs that prioritizes performance, cost and schedule goals tend to slip as 
the program progresses throughout its life cycle. In this case, missed baselines can be 
attributed to both the program office and the contractor. The first schedule change was a 
result of the program office deeming the original schedule as overly aggressive and 
unattainable. Delays from poor testing performance are not uncommon in MDAPs, 
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especially when several immature technologies are involved as seen with the CH-53K. 
Also, the falsely approved 90% release of critical designs prior to CDR led the program to 
proceed to LRIP without a stable design causing future performance failures in testing that 
exceeded cost and schedule goals. The late addition of cybersecurity requirements to the 
CH-53K caused significant cost growth and schedule delays as well. Contractor 
contributions to missed baselines include difficulties in staffing their facilities, a change in 
production locations during the CH-53K’s production phase, and late component arrivals 
from subcontractors. 
Other cost and schedule setbacks that were discussed in this case but did not affect 
program baselines are the increase in CH-53K procurement quantity by the USMC and the 
loss of foreign military sales to Germany. Although both these factors influenced the 
program’s cost, neither should be considered as a “missed goal.” The increase in quantity 
from 156 to 200 aircraft required the program to re-baseline their goals which is not the 
same as exceeding their thresholds. The loss of the potential CH-53K German contract 
forces the U.S. to accept more of the production costs per unit, but since foreign military 
sales are not guaranteed, the program should not have been anticipating this benefit in their 
cost estimations.  
3. How do media portrayals of the program affect the program? 
The media compared the unit costs of the CH-53K to the F-35B in 2020. Those 
costs were $157.6 million for the CH-53K and $101.3 million for the F-35B which depicts 
the negative image of a helicopter as more expensive than the most expensive aircraft 
acquisition program the U.S. government has ever funded (GAO, 2020; Mizokami, 2017; 
Insinna, 2019). The F-35, although a capable aircraft, has been portrayed negatively by the 
media throughout its entire life cycle because of its rapid cost growth throughout its 
development and deployment. Even though the cost comparisons between the CH-53K and 
the F-35 are accurate, the context has been significantly skewed to portray a negative 
outlook on the CH-53K. The unit costs of an LRIP Lot helicopter compared to a fighter jet 
in Lot 14 FRP in the same year are not equivalent comparisons. After FRP begins, unit 
costs decrease as manufacturing processes improve and economies of scale are 
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implemented. The correct comparison to make is between the LRIP unit costs of each 
aircraft, in which case the CH-53K is much less expensive than the F-35. Media attention 
that skews data adds a negative and unnecessary stigma to the program that incorrectly 
sways public opinion and support for the program.  
4. What setbacks in this program could have been avoided? How? 
The program’s original overly aggressive schedule could have easily been avoided 
but was luckily corrected early in the acquisition cycle. Although program funding from 
the PPBE process is schedule driven, it is important to balance that schedule with the event-
driven process of the DAS. Meeting or exceeding performance specifications, especially 
on a complex system with immature technologies, will likely require numerous rounds of 
testing to improve its design. Program offices should plan for failures in test performance 
and allow the acquisition process to only proceed to the next phase when test events are 
accomplished instead of pushing through with an unverified system. The CH-53K program 
did schedule additional time for expected failures; however, the program office and the 
contractors likely underestimated the system’s complexity and the number of tests required 
to achieve acceptable test results which led to missed cost and schedule goals. 
Establishing all system requirements during the MSA phase is essential to 
development and design of the system. The CH-53K program added cybersecurity 
requirements to the aircraft in 2017, over 10 years after the program’s MS B approval and 
concurrently with its MS C decision. MS C initiates production, so adding another 
performance requirement to the system’s design after the system has completed its TMRR 
and EMD phases is guaranteed to add additional costs and schedule delays that were not 
anticipated when the program’s baselines were made.    
Finally, better internal controls in the contractors’ and subcontractors’ processes 
would have alleviated setbacks from late component deliveries and the falsely approved 
CDR based on an inadequate number of released design drawings. A program’s CDR is to 
assess its design maturity for developmental manufacturing, such as prototypes, for the 
TMRR phase (DOD, 2020b). Best practices dictated 90% of drawings should be released 
prior to CDR to ensure a stable design; however, due to poor internal controls, the program 
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thought they released 90% of drawings until an unstable design at CDR determined only 
89% of drawings were released (GAO, 2018). This led to cost and schedule setbacks to 
correct deficiencies in non-critical technologies post-CDR and during prototype 
development.   
5. How do foreign sales impact program decisions? 
The U.S. started with an original procurement quantity of 156 aircraft and then 
increased to 200 aircraft in the 2013 APB (DAMIR, 2019). Assuming Germany was still 
bidding between the CH-53K and CH-47F, potential contracts from Israel and Germany 
could add anywhere from 20–80 CH-53K’s to the program’s production line (Reim, 2020; 
Sprenger, 2020). Therefore, fixed costs associated with the aircraft’s manufacturing would 
be spread over a greater number of aircraft, ultimately lowering the U.S. CH-53K’s average 
per unit cost.  Germany’s decision to pull themselves as a potential buyer of the CH-53K 
came at a cost for the USMC. The German procurement, if the CH-53K won over the CH-
47, would have added an additional 25% to the production line and driven unit costs down 
as the production processes become more efficient over time (Schogol, 2017). With the 
CH-53K unit cost hovering around $131 million for aircraft in early lots, the costs saved 
in future lots as the production process improved would have been hugely beneficial to the 
USMC (Schogol, 2017). Israel’s 20-aircraft procurement is currently the only other 
opportunity for the CH-53K to decrease production costs in the CH-53K. Although 
reducing costs comes at a benefit for the U.S. taxpayer, it is worth noting that foreign 
military sales should not drive program decisions directly. They can certainly benefit the 
success of the program, but, as shown in this case with Germany, foreign sales are not 
always a reliable source of cost reductions.  
6. What are the lessons learned from the CH-53K program that could be 
applied to future defense acquisition programs?   
“Big A” acquisition is a complex process when several intertwined components all 
hoping to achieve the same goal, but from different perspectives and priorities. An event-
driven program is essential to mitigate excessive cost growth and schedule delays. If a 
system or subsystem fails a test event, additional funds will be required to correct its 
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deficiencies, but it is more cost effective to make those corrections earlier rather than later 
when a production line is operating and numerous systems need to be corrected. The same 
concept applies to system requirements added after MS C, such as the cybersecurity 
requirements for the CH-53K. Implementing cybersecurity hardware and software into the 
CH-53K’s design earlier in the acquisition cycle instead of after production began would 
have been more cost effective and likely produced a more suitable design for the 
warfighter.  
Another key takeaway from this case is that procurement numbers affect a system’s 
operational availability, maintenance cycles, and reliability. If there are not enough systems 
to execute missions and allow enough time for proper maintenance cycles, then the system 
will degrade faster which will lead to support complications during the O&S phase that the 
program office is still responsible for mitigating. Although the program office cannot 
demand the USMC or Congress to procure enough systems to alleviate future support 
challenges, they can start planning for potential solutions to anticipated problems.  
Finally, understanding the impact media and public perception can have on a 
program’s decisions and opportunities is beneficial to the success of the program. Senior 
leaders rarely have the time to learn all the details of a program and funding from Congress 
can be swayed by public support, or lack thereof, from constituents. Media portrayals on a 
program, whether accurate or skewed, can indirectly influence a program.   
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APPENDIX A. CONSOLIDATED PROGRAM OF RECORD 
TIMELINE 
CH-53K Program of Record  




2003 Sep Program Completed AoA and initiated the Heavy Lift Replacement Program   
2004 Dec 
Program JROC approved CDD (formerly called Operational Requirements Document)   
Sikorsky 
Delivery order for time and materials to 
perform studies for HLR and Presidential 
Helicopter program  
May-05 
2005 
Jan Sikorsky Receives cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for preliminary design  Jan-08 
Aug Sikorsky Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for engineering delivery order   
Oct Program Completed Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board   
Dec USD (AT&L) MS B approval for $4.4B HLR program to enter SDD phase   
2006 
Jan 
Sikorsky SDD contract awarded for CH-53K   
Subcontractors 
Contract awarded to Rockwell Collins for 
avionics management system    
Contract awarded to Hamilton Sundstrand 
for auxiliary power units, environmental 
controls, and engine starting system 
  
Apr Sikorsky 
Modification to prior cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract for SDD of CH-53K to include 4 
SDD aircraft, 1 GTV, and associated 
support 
Dec-15 
Oct Sikorsky Sikorsky finds improved results to rotor design in testing    
Dec Subcontractors General Electric selected for engine over Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce engines   
2007 May Subcontractors 
Aurora Flight Sciences, EDO Corp, GKN 
Aerospace, and Spirit AeroSystems selected 
for CH-53K fuselage after 12 mo. 
competition and multiple bids. Assemblies 
built for 7 test and certification aircraft (4 
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Goodrich Corp. selected for electrical 
power generation and distribution system   
Heroux-Devtek Inc. (Canadian 
manufacturer) selected for design and 
delivery of landing gears and tail bumper 
for SDD phase CH-53K articles 
  
Foreign Sales  
France & Germany confirm interest in 
heavy-lift helicopter programs. Choices 




Eaton selected for hydraulic power 




Hamilton Sundstrand selected for 
secondary power systems 2009 
Donaldson Company selected for Engine 
Air Particle Protection System (EAPPS)   
Nov Subcontractors Eaton selected for integrated fuel system   
2008 
Feb Subcontractors Northrop Grumman selected for radar warning receiver integration program  2010 
Sep Subcontractors 
Breeze-Eastern Corp. selected for internal 
cargo winch system   
Goodrich Corp. selected for IVHMS Health 
Usage and Monitoring Systems (HUMS)    
2009 
Feb Subcontractors 
BAE Systems selected for cockpit seats, 
cabin armor systems, and integration with 
the fly-by-wire flight controls 
  
Apr Subcontractors 
Curtiss-Wright Controls Inc. selected for 
multi-channel linear variable displacement 
transducers (LVDTs) for the fly-by-wire 
system 
  
May Subcontractors Curtiss-Wright Corp. receives contract for data concentrator units   
Jul Subcontractors GE38 completes engine testing in preparation for SDD phase testing   
2010 
Jan Program Initial Design Review complete and preparations made for CDR   
Feb Subcontractors Cobham selected for leading and trailing edge details for main rotor blade spar   
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Growth: cost increase by 36.4% to 
$25,526.1M due to increase from 156 to 
200 aircraft and a shift in schedule  
  
Initial flight delayed 2 yrs and IOC delayed 







Jun NAVAIR Last delivery of CH-53D/Es from AMARG   
Jun Subcontractors 
Raytheon Co. selected for 50 forward 
looking infrared devices to be fitted on CH-
53E (42) and CH-53K (8) 
  
Jul Program CDR complete   
Sep Subcontractors GKN delivers first aft transition of fuselage   
Nov Subcontractors ITT Corp (formerly EDO) delivers first pair of sponsons for fuselage   
2011 
Jan Sikorsky 
Completes state-of-the-art virtual reality 
center to resolve design complications 
before CH-53K production 
  
Feb Subcontractors Donaldson provides updates on EAPPS, initial DT exceeds expectations   
Apr Program 
Contracts restructured from cost-plus award 





USD(R&E) approves post-CDR assessment 
and program enters Systems Capability and 
Manufacturing Process Demonstration 
  
Sikorsky Begins assembly of first GTV   
Aug 
 
Subcontractors GE delivers first GE38 engine for GTV   





IOC 2019  
Dec Subcontractors Northrop Grumman selected for GPS/fiber-optic inertial navigation system   
2012 Feb 
USMC Retires CH-53D   
Sikorsky Modification to cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for CH-53K software   
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Subcontractors Northrop Grumman receives contract to update software GPS/INS   
Mar Program  
Estimated cost increased to total $3.4B 
because of increased testing, design 
complexity, and contract changes 
  
Apr Sikorsky Modification to cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for CH-53K maintenance plans   
May Sikorsky Modification to cost-plus-award-fee contract for LFT&E    
Dec Sikorsky First GTV delivered for testing   
2013 
Apr Program Updated APB re-baselines program after aircraft quantity increase approved   
May 
Subcontractors 
Program office acquired T-408 engines 
directly from GE   
GE receives firm-fixed-price delivery order 
for critical hard tooling for engines   
Program SAR released: cost increase primarily due to improved cost estimation analyses    







IG Adverse IG Report concludes program increase to 200 aircraft unjustified   
Jul Subcontractors GE receives cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for time critical engine parts Dec-16 
Sep 
IG 
IG Report “CH-53K Program Management 




Raytheon receives firm-fixed-price delivery 





Kratos Defense & Security receives 




EVM penalty: Pentagon is withholding up 
to 5% of payments until Sikorsky corrects 
accounting deficiencies  
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Completes initial testing on the rotors and 
ready for installation on GTV   
2014 
Mar GAO Reports concerns with USMC scheduling CH-53K orders before testing is complete   
May 
Sikorsky Begins full testing on non-flying GTV   
USMC Officially names the CH-53K aircraft the “King Stallion”   
Jun Program PM leadership change from USMC Col. Robert Pridgen to Col. Henry Vanderborght    
Jul Subcontractors GE receives firm-fixed-price contract modification for 16 engines   
2015 Oct Program First flight completed; 11 months behind schedule   
2016 
Mar Program 
Flight testing continues; CH-53K achieves 
flight envelope expansion to 120 kts (goal 
cruise 150kts/max 170kts) 
  
Apr Program 
DOD Advanced Acquisition Contract 
(ACC) awarded for LRIP Lot 1    
CH-53K completes first flight under 
external load with 12,000lbs (goal 
27,000lbs for 110nm) 
  
May Foreign Sales  
Germany increases interest in CH-53K or 




Requirement achieved: CH-53K flies 100ft 
above the ground with 27,000lb external 
payload 
  
Aug Program Flight test for 4 EMD aircraft   
Sep Program 
DOD contract awarded for an additional 2 
SDTA aircraft for demonstration of mature 
manufacturing processes 
  
Oct Program Initial Operational Testing complete   
2017 
Jan Foreign Sales  Israel requests pricing and availability for CH-53K   
Mar Lockheed Martin 
Anticipates award of multi-billion-dollar 
contract from DOD for 200 CH-3K    
Apr Program 
Defense Acquisition Board approves MS C 
status   
APB update approved   
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Sikorsky LRIP begins   
May Sikorsky Modification to prior contract for support of LRIP for 4 Lot II aircraft   
Jul 
Foreign Sales  Sikorsky offers CH-53K to Germany for potential Direct Commercial Sales   
Program Long range flight test achieved   




Program CH-53K redesignated from ACAT 1D to ACAT 1C program   
Subcontractors GE awarded contract for 22 LRIP Lot 1 and Lot 2 engines 
Delivery 
by Jul 2021 
2018 
Feb 
Foreign Sales  
Sikorsky signs contract with Rheinmetall to 
compete in Germany’s heavy-lift 
competition 
  
Sikorsky Modification to prior Navy contract for 7 LRIP Lot 3 aircraft   
Mar Foreign Sales  Sikorsky teams with German manufacturer MTU should Germany select the CH-53K   
Apr Foreign Sales  Sikorsky reveals German industrialization plan for air show competition   
Oct Sikorsky Awarded contract for heavy repair of current CH-53E fleet   
Dec NAVAIR 
Awards cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to 
Sikorsky for database of technical 





Program Deviation Report (PDR) approved 
for schedule delays due to poor testing 
performance; TECHEVAL, IOT&E, IOC, 
and FRP all delayed 
  
DON submits Above Threshold 
Reprogramming (ATR) request for $158M 
to Congress for delivery of deployable IOC 
configuration  
  
Sikorsky Modification to prior contract for maintenance support software   
Feb Program IOC delayed due to design deficiencies  OT&E early 2021 
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Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
approved for program restructure to 
prioritize SDD and provide deployable 
configuration for IOC 
  
Apr Sikorsky Modification to prior contract in support of LRIP   
May 
Sikorsky Contract to build 12 LRIP Lot 2 and Lot 3 aircraft 
Delivery 
2022 
Foreign Sales  Israel expresses interest in CH-53K    
Jul Sikorsky 
Awarded two non-recurring contracts to 
support LRIP 
Oct 2020 & 
Jan 2021 
Awarded firm-fixed-price delivery order for 
hydraulic fluid tanks  Sep-20 
Aug Sikorsky Awarded firm-fixed-price order for LRIP spare parts   
Sep Subcontractors Modification to GE contract for 24 LRIP Lot 3 and 3 Lot 2 engines  Dec-22 
Oct Sikorsky Awarded firm-fixed-price delivery order for 36 CH-53E nacelles production kits   
Nov Program Updated APB approved  
2020 
Jan Program Engine Exhaust Gas Re-ingestion issue resolved    
Feb Sikorsky 
Modification to prior contract for technical 
publications of Lot 2 aircraft   
Modification to prior contract for non-
recurring replacement of Electronic 
Counter Measure Systems 
  
Mar Sikorsky Awarded firm-fixed-price advanced acquisition contract for 7 Lot 5 aircraft Aug-21 
Apr Subcontractors 
Modification to GE contract for Engine 




Modification to prior contract for pilot 
repair material, rate tooling, physical 
configuration audits, and associated 
systems for CH-53K production  
  
Jun Sikorsky Modification to prior contract for logistics, management, and training    
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Order for update to existing CH-53K 
systems/subsystems Oct-22 
Jul Sikorsky Modification to prior contract for pilot repair material  Jun-25 
Aug Sikorsky 
Awarded delivery order for non-recurring 
engineering for Maintenance Task Analysis 
Phase II 
Aug-24 
Sep Foreign Sales  Germany withdraws from competition   
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APPENDIX B. CONSOLIDATED LIST OF SUBCONTRACTORS 
Subcontractor CH-53K Involvement  
General Electric  T-408 Engine 
Aurora Flight 




Fuselage: Tail Rotor, Side Sponsons 
GKN Aerospace Fuselage: Aft Transition (includes cargo ramp and overhead door assembly) 
Spirit AeroSystems Fuselage: Cockpit, Cabin 
Goodrich 
Corporation 
Electrical Power Generation & Distribution System: Generators, 
Controls, AC/DC Converters, Primary Power Distribution, 
Battery, External Controls;  
Integrated Vehicle Healthy Management System (IVHMS) Health 
Usage & Monitoring System (HUMS) 
Heroux-Devtek 
Incorporated Landing Gears, Tail Bumper 
Eaton Hydraulic Power Generation System, Fluid Conveyance Package, Integrated Fuel System 
Hamilton 
Sundstrand  
Secondary Power System: Environmental Control System, 
Auxiliary Power, Main Engine Start System  
Donaldson 
Company Engine Particle Protection System (EAPPS) 
Northrop Grumman 
Radar Warning Receiver: APR-39vX (selected by NAVAIR); 
Global Positioning System (GPS)/Fiber-Optic Inertial Navigation 
System (INS): LN-251 (selected by NAVAIR) 
Breeze-Eastern 
Corporation Internal Cargo Winch System 




Multi-channel Linear Variable Displacement Transducers 
(LVDTs) for the Fly-by-Wire System, Data Concentrator Units 
Raytheon AAQ-29 Day/Night Surveillance Turrets, Memory Loader Verifier System Cables 
Kratos Defense & 
Security 
Maintenance Training Device Suite (MTDS), Helicopter 
Emulation Maintenance Trainer (HEMT) 
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